315. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf Astoria, New York, October 9, 1956, 1:30–3 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Suez Canal
PARTICIPANTS
- US Side:
- Mr. William Rountree
- …
- Egyptian Side:
- Mr. Ali Sabry
… Mr. Ali Sabry invited … us to lunch today in his rooms at the Waldorf-Astoria. The earlier part of the conversation was of a general character, relating mainly to my previous service in Cairo and the Middle East.
We then turned to current United States-Egyptian relations, and Mr. Sabry commented that the American Ambassador and other officials in Cairo had in recent months contacted Egyptian authorities very infrequently; in fact the only meetings which Ambassador Byroade had had with Nasser during the latter weeks of his mission were at the President’s request. This reflected a highly unsatisfactory situation and lent credence to reports, now widely circulated, that the U.S. as well as Great Britain and France, had adopted a policy of bringing about the collapse of the Nasser regime. He said this widespread belief with regard to the policies of the Western governments made it extremely difficult for the Egyptian Government to foresee a solution of the Suez controversy, since obviously it could not accept a settlement which was designed in part to bring about its own collapse. He said the Egyptian Government had realized for some time that the British and French were actively seeking the downfall of the regime, but recent actions of the United States, particularly the withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer and the manner in which it was accomplished, had raised serious questions as to our own intentions.
I spoke at some length on the question of American-Egyptian relations and reviewed the various policies and programs which were designed to help Egypt maintain its independence and progress economically. I went over the Aswan Dam negotiations and the [Page 669] reasons for the withdrawal of our offer. I spoke particularly of the changes in the economic situation of Egypt which had come about after our offer was made, and alluded to the acutely unfriendly policies and pronouncements of the Egyptian government, which included vitriolic broadcasts, the recognition of Red China, and various other actions of this character. I emphasized that in withdrawing the offer for the Aswan Dam we had done so without recrimination, accompanied only by a perfectly objective and straightforward press announcement. I then pointed to Nasser’s reaction, the tenor of his July 26 speech, and the act of nationalization in the explicit context of retaliation. I observed that the Egyptian Government surely must have recognized that such conduct could not but detract from the warm and friendly relations which our two countries had long maintained. Nevertheless, I asserted that we ourselves had by no means given up hope that good relations between the United States and Egypt could be restored and that the question of the Suez Canal, as well as other problems, could be worked out on a mutually advantageous and satisfactory basis. Our policies toward Egypt, moreover, were open and above-board, and the fears which Mr. Sabry had expressed concerning our desire to see the downfall of Nasser had no foundation.
This discussion served the useful purpose of producing a friendly and frank atmosphere and, I think, produced a feeling on the part of Sabry that he could usefully proceed to a more direct exploration of the Suez Canal situation.
Mr. Sabry said that Krishna Menon had formulated a proposal which he (Menon) claimed to have discussed, at least in general, with the British and which he had reason to believe would be accepted by them. Mr. Sabry claimed not to have seen a full presentation of the plan which, he said, had been drawn up in considerable detail. He said Mr. Menon was going to give a copy to Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Fawzi, but he did not know what further distribution would be made. Mr. Sabry did, however, mention various elements of the plan ….
Mr. Sabry seemed quite uncertain as to whether or not Mr. Menon would be successful in selling his plan to the Canal users. In reply to questions, he said he did not know how, when or to whom Mr. Menon would present the plan, but if his understanding of it were correct he thought it likely that the Egyptian Government would go along with it in general. He thought, however, that before committing itself, Egypt should have some assurance that the British and other interested governments would likewise find it acceptable.
At that point Mr. Sabry referred to various statements which had been made by the Secretary and others, to the effect that the Egyptians should come forward with a proposal of their own. He [Page 670] found this extremely difficult. In principle he had no objection, but he thought it would be impossible for Egypt to set forth the details of a plan since this would place the burden on Egypt of anticipating what the users required and fitting this into what the Egyptian government and people could accept. He felt that the details of an arrangement should be worked out by virtue of actual negotiations and not in advance of them.
He said that Egypt would be willing to negotiate with anyone with whom practical arrangements night be worked out. He would be perfectly happy to negotiate directly with the British alone, if that were feasible and were the way to bring about “the happy result.” On the other hand, he thought the Russians would almost certainly insist upon participating in any negotiations in which the British and the French might be involved. He wondered if it might be possible for Egypt to negotiate with representatives of smaller countries, such as Sweden, India, Italy and Spain; although he recognized the difficulty inherent in this procedure, since these countries would really be negotiating on behalf of others vitally interested and who would be signatories to the treaty involved.
In summary, responding to questions put to him on this subject, Mr. Sabry said that he would be entirely willing to enter into negotiations at once with any group charged with the responsibility of representing the users of the Canal. As he saw it, one of the main difficulties lay in excluding the Soviet Union from such a group (although he definitely said Egypt would not insist upon Soviet participation). He did not have firm objections to putting up Egyptian proposals, although he appeared to be at a loss to know how this might usefully be done in advance of negotiations. He seemed to favor at least the general outline of Mr. Menon’s proposals (while denying knowledge of their full content).
Upon leaving, Mr. Sabry said he very much hoped that the” whole problem” could be cleared up while he was in New York, one reason being that he wished to come to Washington to discuss, within the context of a settlement, the broader range of United States-Egyptian relations. I agreed upon the great importance of finding a solution as soon as possible, and said I would be glad to see Mr. Sabry in Washington if he should come down.
After I departed, Mr. Sabry informed … that Mr. Lloyd had asked to see Mr. Fawzi.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 796. Secret. Drafted by Rountree. A marginal notation on the source text reads: “to give most limited distribution”.↩