Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

310. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, October 8, 1956, 4 p.m.¹

Washington, October 8, 1956, 4 p.m.

The President called Herbert Hoover, said that he had been pondering what should be done in preparation for follow-up if no agreement was reached at the present meeting on the Suez Canal, being held in New York. He said it seemed to him that we should not fail to do something about it, possibly dramatic, possibly even drastic. He said he felt that the question of the Suez was probably #1 question in the minds of the American people. He said that we should tell the Council—”we come before you believing in the program of the first London Conference, but what other suggestions have you to offer?”

He said that there were all sorts of things to consider. The British and the French feel that they have got to cut off Nasser, but nothing would make him madder. President is sure we must do something more than talk.

Dulles has many things in mind, said Hoover. At the present time the Foreign Ministers are “sparring around.”

President mentioned the fact that Shepilov tells Dulles one thing, then does another; Hoover said that was typical of the Russian technique.

President really thinks we should find some kind of mechanism to negotiate around. One thing suggested was to have the Security Council meetings in secret, not open to the public, to give a chance to talk in a more constructive way. President would hope that the UN would urge Nasser to confer directly with someone—maybe the Suez Canal Owners Association.

Hoover said that while the French were adamant still on this, the British seem to be taking a more constructive position. He said he was not despairing of the thing at all.

President said he would call Dulles, but he never knew when he was free, and people chase him around if they know the President is calling. Hoover said Dulles would like to talk to him and President told him to arrange it at some time (he, the President, is always available). They did talk later in the evening.²

President said we ought to think of everything, including having Nehru negotiate—Hoover said if Menon were left out he would not mind—President said that he thought Menon’s last suggestion had merit.³

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Prepared in the Office of the President.
2. No account of this conversation has been found in the Eisenhower Library or in Department of State files.
3. A summary of the plan, which reportedly Menon intended to present to the Egyptian and British Governments, is in the Executive Secretariat’s Report for October 5, supra.