Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

291. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, October 2, 1956, 2:20 p.m.¹

Washington, October 2, 1956, 2:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Suez Canal

We discussed the Suez Canal. I pointed out that we had rather bad relations with the British and the French, particularly the latter, because they did not feel we were backing them sufficiently and the governments were blaming their failure to get results on the fact that we were holding them back.

The President thought we should accept some solution which would, for example, assure that a general manager appointed by Egypt would be appointed subject to the approval of SCUA and only hold office as long as SCUA did not object. I said that I thought some solution along this line could be worked out. But the question was whether the British and French really wanted a peaceful solution. I referred to the various projects of the British seemingly in different directions—one favoring a settlement by negotiation; another favoring overthrow by economic pressures; another favoring overthrow by a covert operation and another favoring open use of military force. The President felt that we should have nothing to do with any project for a covert operation against Nasser personally. He felt we should exert strong pressure to get a settlement, but that we should not negotiate behind their backs or without their knowledge and acquiescence. In this connection, I gave the President the letter from Fanfani.² I expressed the view, in which the President concurred, that we had probably better not attempt to negotiate through him, although he could himself develop the subject as he thought appropriate.

I said that it looked as though the Egyptians were sending over a delegation which was itself qualified to negotiate and that it would probably be better to deal with them in this way if negotiation became the order of the day.

The President went on to express the view that he did not think that the Canal issue was the one on which to seek to undermine Nasser. He did feel that Nasser had indicated dangerous tendencies that needed to be curbed. He felt there was promise in developing Arab leadership elsewhere, and that this offered greater hope than a frontal attack on Nasser on the Canal issue.

The President felt that we had to maintain an independent position as regards the British and French until we knew definitely what they were up to.

We discussed briefly the possibility of the President going to New York to say a few words at the opening of the United Nations Security Council meeting. I said I would think this over and give the President my advice the next day.³

JFD

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. In a letter to Eisenhower of September 27, Political Secretary of the Italian Christian Democratic Party Amintore Fanfani proposed sending to Washington an emissary to report on high-level discussions regarding the Suez situation. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File) Fanfani later indicated that the Egyptians had told the Mayor of Florence that they wanted to use an Italian as intermediary between themselves and the United States on the Suez problem. Consequently, Fanfani sent an Italian Foreign Service officer, Raimondo Manzini, to Cairo and then to Washington, where he met with Dulles on September 30 and conveyed Nasser’s assurances that he did not want the Soviet Union to take over Egypt. Dulles asked Manzini to find out exactly what Nasser was willing to do. Subsequently, Manzini visited Egypt twice during the week of September 30–October 7. Nasser gave Manzini the gist of a detailed plan for a permanent arrangement between the nationalized Canal Company and the Users Association and left Manzini with the impression that best results could be obtained by working through Ali Sabry. (Memorandum for the record by Collins, October 7; Department of State, Luce Files: Lot 64 F 26, Letters 1955–56; telegram 1492 from Rome, October 7; ibid., Central Files, 974.7301/10–756)
3. Dulles discussed this matter again with Eisenhower on October 3. According to a memorandum of conversation by Dulles, “The President decided against it [going to the Security Council], feeling that it would overdramatize the situation and that the future program of the British and French was not sufficiently clear for him to commit his prestige. He thought that later on if a really critical situation developed which he could influence, he would be prepared to do so.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)