290. Report Prepared in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State1
SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SUEZ SITUATION
Inauguration of SCUA
At the inauguration of the Suez Canal Users’ Association (SCUA) in London yesterday,2 Lloyd was chosen as Chairman with Lord John Hope as his Deputy. Although Ethiopia, Japan and Pakistan did not immediately subscribe to the new organization, they accepted an invitation for their delegates to remain as observers. Working committees were formed to deal with organizational, finance, and shipping matters. Each delegation is represented on each working committee and the observers also attend the committee meetings.
Yesterday afternoon the working committee on organization reached tentative agreement on the sections in the draft “statute” of by-laws which related to membership, the component organs of the Association, and the Council.3 Further meetings will consider the sections on the Executive Group, the Administrator, the headquarters, and the provisions for voting. Membership has not yet been discussed in the sense of future adherence to the organization, but our position is that additional members should be permitted to adhere on a two-thirds vote of the Council where the applicant shows sufficient dependence on or interest in the use of the Canal.
Aldrich notes that the British draft makes no mention of the receipt or disbursement of revenues accruing to SCUA from canal dues. However, he comments that, as the Council is specifically authorized to give directives to the Executive Group and Administrator, the result should be in accordance with our requirements. To avoid controversy, he thinks we should not insist on a specific reference to the dues question.
[Page 624]Selection of Administrator
Embassy London states4 that, as the Scandinavians have now agreed that Norway should serve as their representative on the Executive Group, it will be more difficult to obtain a Norwegian as the Administrator. Further, although favorable reports have been received on Oyevaar, the Dutch Government has indicated some objection to his candidacy, probably because they are still campaigning actively for a place on the Executive Group. To forestall pressure by other delegations for the appointment of an American as Administrator—which we have been resisting—Aldrich asks if we have any other candidates to put forward.
Egyptian Willingness to Negotiate
Embassy Cairo has transmitted5 a … report of a conversation in which Ali Sabri stated that Egypt hopes SC consideration of the Suez issue will lead to the creation of a negotiating body and that the Egyptians are convinced that a mutually satisfactory agreement can be reached through negotiation provided the UK basic objective is not to “get Nasser”. Sabri also observed that Egypt, while opposed to international control, is willing to enter into international agreements providing for regulations which would be binding upon the Egyptian management and subject to review by the International Court or some other tribunal in the event of a dispute. He also indicated that Egypt would be satisfied if its revenues from the canal are based on the same percentage as was received by the original company. Finally, Sabri stated that the conference proposed by Egypt for October 10 was being held in abeyance as being unrealistic because of the unwillingness of the US, UK and France to participate.
French Views on Future Action
Dillon reports6 that the French clearly intend to insist at the Security Council that Egypt must negotiate on the basis of the recommendations of the First London Conference and must accept international administration of the canal. Nevertheless, the French appear to have tacitly abandoned their intention to use force unless new provocation is offered. Dillon sees the danger of an unproductive French policy continuing to insist on a solution which could only be achieved by the employment of strong measures. He urges that we reach an agreement with Pineau and Lloyd on what the [Page 625] three powers might realistically expect to achieve on the basis of the pressures—economic or otherwise—which they are prepared to undertake. If the three powers then publicly and unanimously state their firm adherence to this course of action, the US will not be repeatedly galled by what are made out by French spokesmen to be a constant series of retreats proposed by France’s allies.
French Attitude on Canal Tolls
In a reply to our aide-mémoire on the payment of Suez Canal tolls, the French Government emphasized:7 1) its unwillingness to pay tolls to SCUA if only one or two other nations are prepared to conform to this practice; 2) its earnest hope that we will take steps to bring about the payment of tolls to SCUA by ships under Panamanian and Liberian registry belonging to US nationals. (In this latter regard, our Embassies in Monrovia and Panama have been told to convey to the Governments to which they are accredited the information that the US is prepared to sponsor their membership in SCUA should they so desire.)
(Summary closed 12:15 p.m., October 2, 1956)
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret; Eyes Only for Designated Recipient.↩
- The Embassy in London transmitted a report on the first meeting of SCUA in telegram 1784, October 1, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–156)↩
- Reported in telegram 1785 from London, October 1, not printed. (Ibid.) The telegram also contained the complete text of the draft by-laws submitted by the British Delegation and tentatively accepted by the Committee as described in this report, and comments by Aldrich.↩
- In telegram 1782 from London, October 1, not printed. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 955 from Cairo, October 1, not printed. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 1543 from Paris, October 1, not printed. (Ibid.)↩
- The text of the French aide-mémoire was transmitted to the Department in telegram 1529 from Paris, October 1, not printed. (Ibid.)↩