Office of the Historian

272. Report Prepared in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State1

Summary No. 18
Washington, September 27, 1956.

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SUEZ SITUATION

Arab “Big Three” Conference at Riyadh2

Embassy Cairo has transmitted3 a … report on the Arab “Big Three” discussions at Riyadh. Saud reaffirmed his support of the tripartite alliance but stated his genuine concern at Egypt’s failure to undertake prior consultation before nationalizing the canal. Nasser [Page 593] replied that complete secrecy was necessary because the British and French might have “moved in” if they had had advance notice. He, however, agreed that Egypt would undertake prior consultation in the future on matters of comparable importance.

… Nasser went on to explain why the government of Egypt could not attend the first London conference and stated that with respect to the Menzies’ mission there was no opportunity for counterproposals as that group had no authority to negotiate. With reference to SCUA, Nasser said that the prompt Egyptian action in rejecting this proposal stemmed from the threatening manner in which it was presented by Eden and was designed to discourage the US from adopting a similar role. He added that he preferred Saudi Arabia to India as a mediator.

Nehru’s Attitude Towards Nasser

Embassy New Delhi reports4 that Nehru, on the eve of his departure for Saudi Arabia, is apparently worried that Nasser will try to meet him and seek to associate India on an unqualified basis with Nasser’s stand on Suez. Actually, while Nehru supports Egyptian independence and sovereignty, he does not want Egypt to have the power to stop ship transits through the canal. In this connection, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has assured the Embassy that Nehru will not meet Nasser on his trip to Saudi Arabia. To the Embassy, the implication is that Nehru does not wish to be cast as the principal supporter of Nasser outside of the communist bloc.

[Here follow a report concerning the United States memorandum on the payment of Canal duties sent to London and Paris (see telegram 2248, Document 268); a report from London that the British Government’s immediate objective was to get SCUA established with as many countries as possible (reported in telegram 1699 from London, September 26; Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–2656); a report from Tokyo that the Japanese Government would not join SCUA immediately but might at a later date (reported in telegram 750 from Tokyo, September 27; ibid., 974.7301/9–2756); and a report from Karachi that the Pakistani Government continued to refuse to join SCUA at that time (reported in telegram 878 from Karachi, September 26; ibid., 974.7301/9–2656).]

(Summary closed 12:00 noon, September 27, 1956)

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret; Eyes Only for Designated Recipient.↩
  2. On September 23, King Saud, President Nasser, and President Quwatly met at Riyadh.↩
  3. Reference is to telegram 892 from Cairo, September 26, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/9–2656)↩
  4. In telegram 773 from New Delhi, September 25, not printed. (Ibid., 791.00/9–2556)↩