271. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 27, 1956, 11 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- The Secretary’s Briefing on Suez Situation with members of Senate Foreign Relations Committee
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- The Under Secretary
- H—Mr. Hill
- H—Mr. O’Connor
- Senator Fulbright
- Senator Mansfield
- Senator H. A. Smith
- Senator Langer
The Secretary opened the conversation by remarking that he was calling a “rump session” of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to brief them on the Suez situation because he had heard that these members were in town. (These four Senators were the only members of the Senate Foreign Relations or House Foreign Affairs or the leadership of either House who were in town).
The Secretary described a little of the background of the first London meeting and of the Cairo meetings of the committee of five. He noted that at Cairo, Nasser had made no counter-proposals and had indicated no disposition to negotiate. After the Cairo meetings, a critical situation emerged because Eden had promised to convene Parliament in order to present to them a program of action if the Cairo meeting produced no results. Moreover, this date coincided with the date the British had set for the completion of their military preparations, i.e., September 15. It appeared that the U.K. had no alternative at this point, between a policy of force or surrender. It was at this point that the Secretary proposed to London and Paris his plan for a users’ association. This proposal was adopted by Eden as a way out of his dilemma. Eden presented it to his Parliament in a far more bellicose manner than the Secretary had ever intended. Because of Eden’s presentation, the Secretary thought it necessary in his press conference the day after to discuss the association with quite a different emphasis. This change has lead [led] to charges that we had “watered down” the original plan. The Secretary stressed that there had been no watering down from his original proposal but only from what had been Eden’s version of it as presented to Parliament. It was only after the Secretary’s presentation of the plan that we were able to obtain promises of attendance for the second London meeting; a number of nations had been reluctant to attend on the basis of Eden’s original presentation.
At the second London meeting, the Secretary’s proposals for the users’ association were adopted substantially as originally proposed. Lange of Norway suggested that the association should coordinate the study of alternatives to the use of the Canal. This suggestion was adopted and the Secretary commented that it was in line with Senator Mansfield’s suggestion on this point.
The Secretary described some of the problems involved in rerouting traffic around the Cape of Good Hope. The greatest burden [Page 590] would be in loss of dollar exchange because of the necessity of replacing Near Eastern oil with oil from this hemisphere. This would cost the U.K. $400 million and the French $100 million in exchange, assuming that the pipelines stayed open. The Secretary said the Export-Import Bank was ready to loan this money.
When the Secretary arrived in London, he found that the U.K.— particularly the Treasury people—were very worried about these costs and had become quite negative about any move which would result in re-routing traffic around the Cape. A further study made it clear that such re-routing would not appreciably hurt Egypt; regardless of the association’s best efforts, much traffic would continue to go through the Canal. Moreover, the British would have very considerable sterling costs and all other countries would face additional expense. The more this matter was studied in London the more enthusiasm for re-routing started to wane. The Italians and Scandinavians, and the Asian countries were particularly opposed to the idea. It was finally agreed that re-routing should be a “next to last” resort. War is being regarded as the last resort.
The Secretary said that enough countries would join SCUA at the meeting on October 1 in London so that the organization could get started. He predicted that some countries of the original eighteen would hold back, waiting to see what happened at the U.N.
At London, there was considerable sentiment to go to the U.N.; however, the Secretary and a majority of others preferred to wait until SCUA was in operation, for two reasons: 1) feared that a number of nations would hold back from membership in SCUA pending U.N. action; 2) SCUA could provide the U.N. with a vehicle for provisional solution and thus allow the time for negotiations to develop, and for a thorough study of the legal rights involved. However, the U.K. and France decided to go ahead with an appeal to the U.N. and made their decision without consultation and while the Secretary was still in his plane returning from London. The Secretary was annoyed at this lack of coordination, but masked his annoyance for the sake of unity. He said that partially as a result of this action, Japan and Pakistan were holding back on joining SCUA and the Secretary feared that the SCUA meeting on October 1 might have only White Nations adhering. The U.K. apparently had been forced to move to the U.N. by domestic political pressures. The Labor Party had demanded such a move and some Conservative Party elements were pushing for U.N. action which would result in a Soviet veto and leave the U.K. free to use force. The Secretary felt the French and the British had moved in a hurry and had not thought through precisely what they hoped to achieve at the U.N. Moreover, it was not clear what their motivation was; there were certainly elements in both countries that hoped only to go through the motions at the [Page 591] U.N., in order to be able to use force at a later date. We did not yet know what the British and French plans were, although hoped to get a draft of their proposed resolution today.
The Secretary said that the British Cabinet was sharply divided on the use of force. Salisbury and Macmillan favored it, and were very influential. The majority of the Cabinet opposed it, and Eden was thus in the middle. In talking with Salisbury and Macmillan, the Secretary observed that they clearly saw how to start the use of force, but did not see clearly how to end it. When SCUA is set up tentatively, the thinking is that U.S., U.K., and French tolls would be paid to the association rather than to Egypt. This action may set off the refusal of Egypt to let ships through the Canal and thus force the re-routing of shipping. However, before the U.S. takes this action, we will insist on firm commitments from the U.K. and the French that they want us to do so, that they are willing to do so themselves, and that they fully recognize the possible consequences thereof.
The Secretary said SCUA involved no legal obligations and therefore no Congressional action. It was an entirely voluntary organization, to which the United States expected to adhere by executive action at the London meeting on October 1.
The Secretary said there was some bitterness being generated against the U.S. in both the U.K. and France alleging that we had let them down. Such criticism was regrettable but inevitable in view of our moderating role.
The Secretary felt that events were working towards a settlement. The Egyptians were feeling the economic pinch, particularly in their balance of payments; also because of loss of tolls, tourists, business credit and markets for their cotton. We were receiving many indications that the Egyptians were ripening for a settlement. The Secretary was certain that the technical aspects of the problem could be worked out, but fearful that the prestige issues might make such settlement impossible. From a technical point of view, there were only two areas that needed protection against possible covert obstruction of Canal traffic by the Egyptians. These points were the allotment of pilots and the assignment of ships to the traffic pattern.
The Secretary felt that there was considerable danger that Israel might take advantage of the crisis by taking over the part of Jordan, west of the Jordan River. Under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible for the U.S. to implement the 1950 Declaration to protect Jordan against such Israeli action. The Israelis were being strongly tempted by this situation; however, the growing Israeli aggressiveness should produce some pressure on the Arabs and on Egypt for a settlement. The Saudi Arabians were not as close to [Page 592] Nasser as would publicly appear, and seemed to be playing a helpful role in the situation.
Mansfield said that he would like to see the legal rights of the Suez Canal Company passed on by the International Court of Justice. He recognized that this was a lengthy process and did not offer an early solution, but felt that in the long run it was necessary to satisfy world opinion. He also felt this entire situation called for a speed up in the development of atomic power.
Mr. Hoover said that the Egyptian pilots thus far had been handling the job well, but that within a month or two would come the period of fog and sandstorms which would really test the ability to keep the Canal operating. In response to Senator Langer’s question, re: “Sources of oil from Lignite and Shale,” Mr. Hoover pointed out that technically the process was feasible, but that it was estimated to cost four to five times more than normal production to produce oil from this source. The present supply of oil reserves was nine years, but this did not include anticipated new discoveries.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Hill asked if the Senators had any suggestions as to being kept informed and as to whether they had heard any complaints from their colleagues as to lack of information. The only specific response was from Senator Fulbright that he had heard no complaints.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)↩