Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

191. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and Secretary of State, White House¹

Washington, September 8, 1956, 6:30 p.m.

I met with the President in the Oval Room at the Mansion. I told him that I had spent some time studying his draft of the reply to Eden² and that I had suggested some changes, particularly designed to give the British and the French a stronger case for not resorting to force. I felt that after they had gone as far as they had and were now rebuffed by Nasser, they could not merely bring their troops home and say they would wait to see whether Nasser was as bad as they feared. Therefore, I suggested holding out the prospect of an organization of the users which would be designed in effect to carry on the momentum of the London Conference; the use by the users’ organization of their own pilots and their collection of the fees with allocation to Egypt on a cost basis; the putting into effect or the announcing of alternatives to the use of the Canal so far as oil was concerned, and the continuance of some economic measures taken against Egypt.

The President went over my draft³ and indicated his approval of it, although he expressed the view that he felt that world opinion inclined to side with Nasser on the proposition that since the Canal went through their territory, he was entitled to direct the operations. The President said that even though as a matter of law those who enjoyed an easement were entitled to organize themselves for its use, the public was not yet educated to accept this legal point of view, and that we would still have a job to do in public relations.

I questioned the paragraph about Napoleon and his successors on the ground that they had been dealt with by force and it might be inappropriate to suggest that analogy. The President laughed and said he guessed I was right and struck out the paragraph.

After the President had finalized the text he sent it to Mrs. Whitman to retype so that I would have it to deliver that evening to the British Ambassador.

While the typing was going on, I showed the President the draft outline of a plan for a users’ association.⁴ The President went through this and said he thought it was interesting but was not sure that it would work. I said I was not sure either but that I felt we had to keep the initiative and to keep probing along various lines, particularly since there was no chance of getting the British and the French not to use force unless they had some alternatives that seemed to have in them some strength of purpose and some initiative.

The President expressed again his deep concern that military measures should not be taken.

At this point the message to Eden was brought back, the President initialed it and gave it to me to deliver to the British Ambassador.⁵

JFD

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings With the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.
2. Supra.
3. Attached to the source text. The text of the message as delivered to the British Embassy is printed infra.
4. Attached to the source text, but not printed. The document is entitled “Outline of Proposal for a Voluntary Association of Suez Canal Users”. The first page indicates that it was drafted by Dulles and that this paper was draft no. 2, dated September 8. A handwritten marginal notation reads: “Taken by Sec. to show to Pres 9/8/56”. A subsequent draft (no. 4), dated September 9, is Document 198.
5. Infra.