190. Draft Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden 1
Dear Anthony : Whenever, on any international question, I find myself differing even slightly from you, I feel a deep compulsion to re-examine my position instantly and carefully. But permit me to suggest that when you use phrases in connection with the Suez affair, like “ignoble end to long history” in describing the possible future of your great country, you are making of Nasser a much more important figure than he is.
We have a grave problem confronting us in Nasser’s reckless adventure with the Canal, and I do not, repeat not, differ from you in your estimate of his intentions and purposes. The place where we apparently do not agree is on the probable effects in the Arab world of the various possible reactions by the Western world.
You seem to believe that any long, drawn-out controversy either in the ad hoc twenty-two nations’ committee or in the United Nations will inevitably make Nasser an Arab hero and seriously damage the prestige of Western Europe and the United Kingdom and including the United States. Further you apparently believe that [Page 432] there would soon result an upheaval in the Arab nations out of which Nasser would emerge as the acknowledged leader of Islam. This, I think, is a picture too dark and is severely distorted.
It took your nation some eighteen years to put the original Napoleon in his proper place, but you did it. You have dealt more rapidly with his modern imitators.
I shall try to give you a somewhat different appraisal of the situation. First, let me say that my own conclusions are based to some degree upon an understanding of current Arab feeling that differs somewhat from yours. I believe that as this quarrel now stands before the world, we can expect the Arabs to rally firmly to Nasser’s support in either of two eventualities. The first of these is that there should be a resort to force without thoroughly exploring and exhausting every possible peaceful means of settling the issue, regardless of the time consumed.
The second is that we should act forcibly when there is no evidence before the world that Nasser intends to do more than to nationalize the Canal Company. Unless it can be shown to the world that he is an actual aggressor, then I think all Arabs would be forced to support him, even though some of the ruling monarchs might very much like to see him toppled.
The matter might become even more serious than this. I venture the thought that if any large nation should attempt to settle by force an argument with a small one, without first having exhausted all of the peaceful avenues open to it, the United Nations organization would be badly weakened and possibly destroyed.
It is for reasons such as these that we have viewed with some misgivings your preparations for mounting a military expedition against Egypt. We believe that Nasser may try to go before the United Nations claiming that these actions imply a rejection of the peaceful machinery of settling the dispute, and therefore may ask the United Nations to brand these operations as aggression.
I think the beliefs I have just expressed are shared by the vast bulk of the American people, including most of those in official life.
At the same time, we want to stand very firmly with you in assuring permanent free and effective use of the Suez waterway under the terms of the 1888 Treaty. Assuming the breakdown of the present conversations with Nasser, I think we must strive to the utmost of our ability to convince the United Nations that the eighteen-nation stand in this affair was just and fair. Possibly we may fail to do that because of the veto privilege. Nevertheless, as time goes on in these arguments, one of two things must surely happen if we are correct in our belief that the Egyptians cannot, and possibly even do not intend to, operate the Canal for the benefit of all nations and without prejudice to any.
[Page 433]The first thing that might likely happen would be the complete or partial breakdown of operations. If this came about, I would suspect that no nation in the world would object to a physical penetration of the area by the principal users for the purpose of getting their shipping through the waterway. If Egypt should use force to prevent this, we would have to evaluate the event at that moment. They would then be the aggressor and under those circumstances we might gain almost universal approval for restoring order and effective operation, and this approval might even include the other Arab countries.
The other likely possibility during long negotiations would be that Nasser’s impatience might lead him to some kind of drastic action that would be aggressive in character and which could again bring to our side world opinion, including the Arabs.
Whatever time might elapse between now and the occurrence of some such incident as I have indicated, the Canal would presumably be operating efficiently, and during that period there should be some opportunity for cementing our relationships with other Arab countries who would be damaged by the closing of the Canal, and in which countries the governments could be doing something to educate public opinion. Gradually, it seems to me, we could isolate Nasser and gain a victory which would not only be bloodless, but would be more far-reaching in its ultimate consequences than could be anything brought about by force of arms. In addition, it would be less costly both now and in the future.
I assure you we are not blind to the fact that eventually there may be no escape from the use of force. The Canal must operate under conditions in which all users can have confidence. But to resort to military action when the world believes there are other means available for resolving the dispute would set in motion forces that could lead, in the years to come, to the most distressing results.
I know, of course, that in our general philosophy we are as one. These letters are confined to the discussion of differing methods and for me, at least, serve the purpose of clarifying the confusing and conflicting considerations that obviously apply to this problem. As it now stands, our main difference seems to be largely the result of differing conclusions as to the probable reaction of the Arab world to the various lines of action open to us.
With warmest regard,
As ever, your friend,2
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Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Misc. Papers—U.K. (Suez Crisis. Secret. On September 8, President Eisenhower forwarded this draft to Secretary Dulles under cover of a note which reads: “Dear Foster: Here is a draft in reply to Anthony’s letter [Document 181] that I have been preparing. The only usefulness it might have is in its attempt to destroy Anthony’s apparent fixation that delay or long drawn out negotiations might result in catastrophe for Great Britain and the West.
“I am not even sure that it is worth while sending the document, but won’t you look it over and send it back to me with any comments you may care to make? As ever, DE.”
↩ - Printed from an unsigned copy.↩