187. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State1
TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE PRESIDENT
The President called and said he had been thinking some more of the plan about reorganizing the Canal which he had mentioned to the Secretary this morning.2 He had in mind sending someone like Bob Anderson over to talk with Nasser, explaining how the reorganization would work. The Pres. admitted the idea did not have everything which Nasser wanted but at least it was so much different than anything else that had been offered that it might work and it did not constitute complete surrender. The Sec. said this would require Nasser to cancel his nationalization decree, which the Sec. said was a much tougher thing for him to do than the proposals we had made.
The President said that Nasser had started the whole business by wanting to build the Aswan Dam. The Secretary said he would rather have the rights than the money and he did not think Nasser [Page 419] could be bribed. The Sec. said one trouble was we are working with the Committee and representing the 18 nations and he did not know how we could go off on our own and negotiate.
The Sec. mentioned the British proposal for action on the Security Council and that the British and French were coming in again at 5:00 today for further discussion. They want to bring action saying that the Egyptians are threatening the peace because they haven’t accepted the proposals. The Sec. considered this a very extravagant idea. The Sec. thought it maybe was all right to get it into the Security Council in some way. Undoubtedly there would be a race on Monday in the Security Council to see which one—the Egyptians or the British and French—would bring charges against the other first.
The Sec. said the British liked the second plan3 but felt there was not time to work it out. They say they have to be prepared to move.
Going back to Bob Anderson,4 the Sec. said he had been used so much he wondered about the advisability of choosing him. The Pres. wondered about Eric Johnston. He had been identified with another plan and maybe that would work out. The Pres. said he was just trying to think of some solution “this fellow”5 would accept. The Sec. said the British were getting awfully sensitive because they feel we are not working with them. The Sec. said Menzies was giving Henderson trouble, accusing Henderson of playing a separate game.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Asbjornson. Another memorandum of this conversation, transcribed at the White House presumably by Whitman, is ibid., Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. The two memoranda differ in detail. The memorandum printed here appears to contain a more complete version of the conversation.↩
- Reference is to the telephone conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles that morning; see Document 183.↩
- Reference presumably is to Dulles’ idea for a Suez Canal Users Association.↩
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The version of this conversation, transcribed in the White House, at this point reads as follows:
“Dulles said: I would like to have some channel of private negotiation. I have a notion this could be worked out if we were in a position to do it. But we are part of a committee representing 18 nations—could not go off and negotiate ourselves. President agreed it would have to be done secretly and delicately, by someone outside of government. Thought also of Eric Johnston. Dulles said we’re under pressure of time. He would of course like to have someone out there, but without double-crossing British & French.”
↩ - Reference is to Nasser.↩