Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

186. Report Prepared in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State¹

Summary No. 4

Washington, September 7, 1956.

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SUEZ SITUATION

Cairo Negotiations²

Nasser has made it clear that he is irrevocably opposed to any international authority with control and management functions; such matters must be in the hands of Egypt. He has only proposed an agreement on certain matters such as tolls.

As, therefore, the central feature of the 18-nation proposal is unacceptable, Menzies considers there is no need for further discussions. He urges the submission to Nasser of a memorandum rehearsing with great care the 18-nation proposal, arguments supporting it, and Nasser’s answers thereto. Such a document would probably elicit a written reply from Nasser, which Menzies considers the Committee should accept as Nasser’s rejection of the 18-nation proposal. But Menzies does not feel the Committee should discuss Nasser’s counter-proposals with him nor transmit them to the 18 nations.

Henderson’s view is that details of Nasser’s counter-proposals should be transmitted as part of the Committee’s report to the 18 nations. However, Henderson reports³ that he is commencing to encounter difficulties with Menzies and the other committee members as a consequence of the tireless Egyptian press campaign to the effect that the US does not really support the proposals of the Committee and is looking for other solutions more acceptable to Egypt.

US Proposal

Henderson considers⁴ that our suggestion for institutional control through an international “association of users” would lead to constant difficulties and friction, and would be even more unpalatable to Egypt than the 18-nation proposal. He is convinced that Menzies and the other committee members would not look with favor on such a suggestion, which the British Ambassador has already rejected in talks with Byroade.

UK Views

The British position was reviewed at length by Eden and Lloyd in a talk yesterday with Senator George, Barbour and Holmes.⁵ Eden stressed that he cannot permit the situation to remain static. Lloyd advocates announcing within two or three days after the end of the Cairo talks that the principal users of the canal will, in the future, pay tolls only to the old company or to an account in escrow outside of Egypt. He envisages the effect of such an announcement will be that Nasser might refuse to permit ships to transit the canal, in which case he would be in clear violation of the 1888 Convention.

Although Barbour pointed out that such an action would probably not put Nasser in the wrong in so far as American opinion was concerned, Eden said that the Arabs will interpret any other course short of military intervention as a sign of weakness. With such an announcement, the British position in the Arab world can be maintained while other steps towards a peaceful solution are taken.

Eden also acknowledged his understanding of the US position. Although reiterating a determination to intervene militarily if all else fails, he indicated that he is disposed to take the matter to the UN in the first instance. He was extremely skeptical that any useful result could be expected from UN action, but said that in any event the British are not prepared to take military steps yet and, in fact, that he has slowed down the military build-up.

French Views

The close liaison between the UK and French on the Suez question is clearly evident. Foreign Office officials have discussed very tentatively with our Embassy in Paris⁶ possible economic sanctions and the reference of the problem to the UN. They view as the only effective economic sanction that of refusing to pay tolls to the new company, or making payment outside of Egypt to be held in escrow pending eventual settlement. In the case of the UN, they would strongly oppose calling a special session of the General Assembly but would probably go along with a reference to the Security Council—although having no faith in its utility.

Emergency and Evacuation Plans

Embassy London reports⁷ that a Cabinet decision on British plans for Middle East evacuation is possible this week-end. The Foreign Office wishes to advise UK nationals in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria to leave as soon as possible, but does not plan evacuations in any other countries in the area for the time being.

Embassy Amman reports⁸ that the “drift” of British civilians from Jordan is continuing. King Hussein has expressed real satisfaction to our Chargé at the absence of a similar American movement.

Byroade emphasizes⁹ that, in the event of UK-French armed action against Egypt, the Embassy would require several days’ advance notice to carry out evacuation by air. Lacking such notice, no evacuation would be possible and the Embassy would find itself in a “state of siege”.

Tappin, meanwhile, points up¹⁰ the danger of flash action by Egyptian-organized mobs in Tripoli if hostilities develop over Suez. He has no confidence that the Government would provide protection for Westerners in Tripoli, although law and order should be maintained in Benghazi. Nuri plans to declare martial law in Iraq¹¹ if the Suez talks break down, not as military action, he told Gallman, “but as insurance against Communist-inspired actions”.

(Summary closed 11:30 a.m., September 7)

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret; Eyes Only for Designated Recipient.
2. Reference is to the meeting between the Five-Nation Committee and Nasser on the evening of September 5. Henderson reported on this meeting and on the meeting of the Five-Nation Committee that follow in telegram 618, September 6, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–656)
3. In telegram 623, Document 180.
4. In telegram 623.
5. Barbour reported on this conversation in telegram 1335 from London, September 6, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–656) Julius C. Holmes, the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant, evidently accompanied Senator George on his trip.
6. Reported in telegrams 1092, September 5, and 1115, September 6, both from Paris, neither printed. (Both ibid., 974.7301/9–556 and 974.7301/9–656)
7. In telegram 1334 from London, September 6, not printed. (Ibid., 280.4122/9–656)
8. In telegram 185 from Amman, September 6, not printed. (Ibid., 785.41/9–656)
9. In telegram 626 from Cairo, September 6, not printed. (Ibid., 974.7301/9–656)
10. In telegram 145 from Tripoli, September 6, not printed. (Ibid.)
11. Reported in telegram 376 from Baghdad, September 6, not printed. (Ibid.)