179. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 6, 1956, 2:30 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Congressional Consultation on Cairo Meeting re Suez
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Senator Hubert H. Humphrey
- Senator Mike Mansfield
- Senator William Langer
- Representative James P. Richards
- Representative A. S. J. Carnahan
- (Also Carl Marcy and Boyd Crawford2)
The Secretary welcomed the Congressional leaders explaining that since he had learned that there were a number of important members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees present in Washington, he thought it was worth while to meet with them and bring them up-to-date on the Suez situation. He described the background of events leading to the London Conference and outlined the positions taken at that Conference. He then described in general terms the so-called “Dulles proposal”.
The Secretary said that the initial reports, including the ones of the Menzies committee meeting last night with Nasser, were not encouraging. The Egyptians showed no compromise on the fundamental issue of international control. The problem now was what next to do. The British and French have felt from the beginning that military operations would be necessary to curb Nasser. The British feel that if Nasser gets away with it, it will start a chain of events in the Near East that will reduce the U.K. to another Netherlands or Portugal in a very few years. The French feel that they are already at war in North Africa and that they might as well carry that war to the real heart of the opposition, namely Cairo. The Secretary said we now must find further steps to postpone the U.K. and French use of force. We are, with the U.K., exploring possible steps in the U.N.
The Secretary said that he and the President were strongly discouraging the U.K. and France on the use of force. The Secretary described the problems that the U.K. would face in any use of force in the area. The initial advantage would be more than offset in the long run. The Secretary doubted British assurances that they would be able to take care of the situation without U.S. help provided the Soviets stayed out. Therefore we felt in the long run that it is [Page 397] disastrous for the French and the U.K. militarily to intervene at this point. On the other hand we cannot oppose too strongly their taking steps which they feel to be in their own national interest; otherwise responsibility shifts to us.
Senator Mansfield reiterated suggestions which he said he had publicly made before: All necessary steps should be taken and publicly announced for expanding shipment of oil to Europe by means other than via the Suez. All U.S. tankers should be taken out of the mothball fleet. A program of construction of 70 to 100 thousand ton tankers should be started at once. All alternative methods of shipping oil to be thoroughly explored so as to minimize Western dependence on the Suez. Senator Mansfield praised the Secretary for an outstanding job in moderating the British and French positions. He described the over-all situation as an effort for the West to buy sufficient time in the Middle East to allow the Western nations to switch from an oil economy to an atomic energy economy. He said that regardless of the political situation in the Middle East, it was clear that the world’s oil supply was not inexhaustible and such a switch must come sooner or later.
Senator Humphrey also praised the Secretary and hoped that we could at the proper time take a strong lead in the U.N. Senator Humphrey strongly supported Senator Mansfield’s idea of creating alternatives to Western dependency on the Suez. The Secretary said that the Soviets have been playing an “evil game” in this situation and that they were actively seeking to bar any settlement, realizing that they themselves would be the only victors if war broke out in the area. The Secretary pointed out that many of the Arab Governments were very worried by Nasser’s actions but felt powerless to interfere with him in view of his great popularity with the peoples of their own country. The Secretary stressed that our problem in the long run was how to guide the new nations from colonialism to independence in an orderly way. We must have evolution, not revolution. In this effort the United States is destined to play a mediating role between the powers of Western Europe and the new nations of Asia and Africa; a most unpopular position but one essential to orderly transition. The Congressmen appeared to agree with this analysis of the situation.
Senator Langer asked if we were bound to assist the British and the French if they used force in the area. The Secretary said not legally but that in a similar situation in 1st and 2nd World Wars we had ultimately intervened in order to save our Allies. As to whether that might happen again, the Secretary said the Congressmen were in a better position to judge than he was—that it was Congress who declared war.
[Page 398]The Secretary was asked as to the Israeli role in the present crisis. He said they were keeping quiet, undoubtedly on the calculation that whatever happened in the area would be helpful to them in one way or another. The Secretary indicated that the Israelis have finally rejected all of Hammarskjold’s suggestions for strengthening the armistice and that Hammarskjold feels he can do nothing more with them. The Secretary was asked what form action in the U.N. might take. He said we had not reached any final decision as yet but that we would probably go to the Security Council and seek some kind of resolution calling upon the parties to renounce the use of force and to accept some form of international regulations over operations of the Canal.
The meeting throughout was most cordial and friendly in tone. There was no partisanship injected and the Secretary was not criticized at any point. The conversation was exceedingly frank and candid and there is no doubt that the Congressmen present were fully aware of the gravity of the situation but also understood that the next moves in the situation were up to the British and French. There is no doubt that they quite thoroughly approved the Secretary’s role in attempting to moderate the British and French positions.