178. Report Prepared in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State1
SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SUEZ SITUATION
Cairo Negotiations
In last night’s meeting with the Suez Committee,2 Nasser made it completely clear that Egypt would not accept any institutional arrangement which would provide for the operation of the Canal by an international body. Nasser stated, however, that he was prepared to enter into international conventions to dispel the justified uneasiness of user powers, e.g., to regulate tolls. Nasser also emphasized Egypt’s willingness to discuss international arrangements for the [Page 394] regulation of the canal. Henderson took this to mean that Egypt would be prepared to give an undertaking not to misuse its operational power by discriminating in such matters as the order in which vessels of various nations would enter the canal.
Nasser said that Egypt would be prepared to submit to the International Court of Justice any claims that it was violating the Convention of 1888. He indicated agreement, although he did not give a definite undertaking, that the violation of any supplementary international agreements regarding tolls and so forth would also go to the International Court.
Henderson comments that, clearly, the Committee will not now be able to obtain Egypt’s agreement to the 18–nation proposals. The Committee is meeting this morning to decide on its next step. Although he infers that Menzies wishes the mission to terminate its work almost immediately in a friendly atmosphere and return to London to make its report, Henderson agrees with the Iranian and Swedish belief that the Committee should have more conversations before returning.
Canal Pilots
In response to our query, our Embassies in London and Paris have both reported3 their understanding that the Suez Canal Company is not encouraging its pilots to leave at this time. The company’s decision to ask the pilots to stay at work at least until the conclusion of the Suez Committee’s discussions apparently still stands.
Nevertheless the pilots’ present state of low morale and physical exhaustion has created a critical situation. The French Foreign Office pointed out that, although it is impossible to control absolutely the actions of either the Suez Company or of the pilots, it would be very helpful if Menzies could communicate directly with the pilots, expressing his appreciation for their continued services under present difficult conditions and urging them to be patient.
[Page 395]King Saud’s Comments on Suez Situation
King Saud has told an Embassy Jidda representative4 that, if he had not sent Yusuf Yasin to Cairo, Nasser would have refused to talk with the Suez Committee, and that Nasser had stopped the radio attacks on the US on his advice. While Nasser would not accept international control or authority over the canal, Saud thought a satisfactory compromise could be found and said he would continue to use his influence with Nasser. He suggested the US could assist by lifting its economic controls and persuading its friends to stop their military mobilization and economic sanctions.5 He said he understood Menon was working along these lines and that the UK has asked Nehru to mediate with Egypt to find a mutually acceptable compromise.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret; Eyes Only for Designated Recipient. The source text bears Eisenhower’s initials.↩
- This meeting with Nasser took place in Cairo from 7 to 8:45 p.m., September 5. Henderson reported on the highlights of the meeting in telegram 613, September 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–556) His full report is in telegram 614, September 6. (Ibid., 974.7301/9–656) Neither telegram is printed.↩
- In telegram 1299 from London, September 5, and telegram 1090 from Paris, September 5, neither printed. (Both ibid., 974.7301/9–556)↩
- Telegram 118 from Jidda, September 4, reported that on September 1 Ambassador Wadsworth had sent a Saudi consultant employed by the Embassy, Mohamed Massoud, secretly to Riyadh to deliver a copy of a message from Eisenhower to Saud. That evening the King met secretly with Massoud and conveyed to him the views contained in this summary report. The following morning the King’s formal reply to the President’s message was handed to Massoud. Saud’s message once again requested the United States to issue orders that would annul the economic measures taken against Egypt and to convince other states to terminate military mobilizations and economic and financial controls, as these impeded the attainment of a peaceful solution. (Ibid., 974.7301/9–456) A copy of telegram 118 in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File bears Goodpaster’s handwritten notation: “Noted by President 5 Sept 56. G.”↩
- On September 6, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Berry informed the Saudi Arabian Ambassador that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles had received King Saud’s message of September 1 (attachment to Document 159) and were most appreciative of the continued exchanges with the King on this issue. Berry explained that the provisions for control of Egyptian assets were a product of unusual circumstances, but that adequate provision had been made so that funds could be released. Berry emphasized that the funds were not irrevocably frozen; but in the present circumstances the United States did not feel that it could completely remove the freezing order. The United States still hoped for satisfactory results from the Cairo talks and for a peaceful solution that would make current regulations regarding Egyptian funds unnecessary. Berry also explained that private Egyptian funds had not been blocked and that funds were being made available for normal Egyptian Government operations in the United States. (Memorandum of conversation by Newsom, September 7; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 722, Saudi Arabia—General)↩