Office of the Historian

161. Memorandum by the Secretary of State1

Duck Island, Lake Ontario, September 2, 1956.

It seems to me, as I reflect in semi-retirement, that we are somewhat hynotized by the pattern of the Concession and do not enough rely on the Treaty itself.2

[Page 352]

Unfortunately, I do not have a copy of the Treaty, but as I recall it gives the right to pass “freely” through the Canal. Does this not mean free of any charges and impediments that Egypt may impose in its national interest?

It is true that the Concession involved an arrangement, somewhat inconsistent with the Treaty, in that it provided that both Egypt and the Company and its shareholders, largely British and French, would get a profit and, because this was modest, it was generally acquiesced in. But Egypt has called that off. Did she not thereby call off her right to profit and the Canal automatically revert to a “non-profit” status?

As to pilots, why do the ships have to hire pilots through Egypt? Why cannot the British, French or any others supply pilots? There are some physical problems, but could not these be handled, if need be, through the Naval craft authorized to be stationed at each end of the Canal?

Then there is the question of keeping the Canal physically free from fill-ins and obstructions. This, it seems to me, is a matter of common interest and not a means of discrimination. If Egypt cannot or does not do this, then I believe that the Parties to the 1888 Treaty have the right to keep the Canal “free” in this physical sense. A charge could be made to create a fund to defray this cost.

Then there is the question of “traffic pattern”. I see no reason why Egypt has any right to direct this. I do not, however, know enough about the physical set-up to suggest a solution, but there should be one. Probably 98 percent of the traffic would voluntarily follow non-Egyptian guidance.

We could agree that some of the functions could be directed by an agent appointed by the Security Council.

Would not a program along these lines, announced as an alternative to the 18 Nation proposal, “deflate” Nasser and be a better alternative than force? It rests squarely on the 1888 Treaty, and if Nasser uses force to obstruct this program he would be violating the Charter and its “renunciation of force” Covenant.3

JFD

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 772. Top Secret. The source text, which contains Dulles’ first thoughts on creating an association of Suez Canal users, was initialed by Dulles and bears his handwritten revisions. A retyped copy is ibid., Central Files, 974.7301/9–256.

    According to Dulles’ Appointment Book, on September 2 the Secretary met with Fraser Wilkins “re Suez” between 9:30 and 11 a.m. at Duck Island. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) Presumably, Wilkins conveyed the contents of the memorandum back to the Department of State and discussed the proposed response to Lloyd. See Document 163.

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  2. Reference is to the Egyptian Concession to the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company and the Treaty of 1888. See Document 1.↩
  3. Dulles handed this memorandum to the President on September 4; see Document 168.↩