Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

163. Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden¹

Washington, September 2, 1956.

Dear Anthony: I am grateful for your recent letter, and especially for your kind words on the role of the United States during the London Conference on the Suez Canal. I share your satisfaction at the large number of nations which thought as we do about the future operation of the Canal. In achieving this result we have set in motion a force which I feel will be very useful to us— the united and clearly expressed opinion of the majority users of the Suez waterway and of those nations most dependent upon it. This will exert a pressure which Nasser can scarcely ignore. From Foster I know that this accomplishment is due in no small measure to the expert leadership exhibited by Selwyn Lloyd as Chairman of the Conference, and to the guidance which he received from you.

As for the Russians, it is clear that they sought, at London, to impede the consolidation of a majority point of view, and to generate an atmosphere in the Near East which would make it impossible for Nasser to accept our proposals. I entirely agree with you that the underlying purpose of their policy in this problem is to undermine the Western position in the Near East and Africa, and to weaken the Western nations at home. We must never lose sight of this point.

Now that the London Conference is over, our efforts must be concentrated on the successful outcome of the conversations with Nasser. This delicate situation is going to require the highest skill, not only on the part of the five-nation Committee but also on the part of our Governments. I share your view that it is important that Nasser be under no misapprehension as to the firm interest of the nations primarily concerned with the Canal in safeguarding their rights in that waterway.

As to the possibility of later appeal to the United Nations, we can envisage a situation which would require UN consideration and of course there should be no thought of military action before the influences of the UN are fully explored. However, and most important, we believe that, before going to the UN, the Suez Committee of Five should first be given full opportunity to carry out the course of action agreed upon in London, and to gauge Nasser’s intentions.

If the diplomatic front we present is united and is backed by the overwhelming sentiment of our several peoples, the chances should be greater that Nasser will give way without the need for any resort to force. This belief explains our policy at the Conference and also explains the statement which I gave out through Foster after I got back from San Francisco and had a chance to talk fully with him.²

³ I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point onward our views on this situation diverge. As to the use of force or the threat of force at this juncture, I continue to feel as I expressed myself in the letter Foster carried to you some weeks ago. Even now military preparations and civilian evacuation exposed to public view seem to be solidifying support for Nasser which has been shaky in many important quarters. I regard it as indispensable that if we are to proceed solidly together to the solution of this problem, public opinion in our several countries must be overwhelming in its support. I must tell you frankly that American public opinion flatly rejects the thought of using force, particularly when it does not seem that every possible peaceful means of protecting our vital interests has been exhausted without result. Moreover, I gravely doubt we could here secure Congressional authority even for the lesser support measures for which you might have to look to us.

I really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forcible means. The use of force would, it seems to me, vastly increase the area of jeopardy. I do not see how the economy of Western Europe can long survive the burden of prolonged military operations, as well as the denial of Near East oil. Also the peoples of the Near East and of North Africa and, to some extent, of all of Asia and all of Africa, would be consolidated against the West to a degree which, I fear, could not be overcome in a generation and, perhaps, not even in a century particularly having in mind the capacity of the Russians to make mischief.⁴ Before such action were undertaken, all our peoples should unitedly understand that there were no other means available to protect our vital rights and interests.

We have two problems, the first of which is the assurance of permanent and efficient operation of the Suez Canal with justice to all concerned. The second is to see that Nasser shall not grow as a menace to the peace and vital interests of the West. In my view, these two problems need not and possibly cannot be solved simultaneously and by the same methods, although we are exploring further means to this end. The first is the most important for the moment and must be solved in such a way as not to make the second more difficult. Above all, there must be no grounds for our several peoples to believe that anyone is using the Canal difficulty as an excuse to proceed forcibly against Nasser. And we have friends in the Middle East who tell us they would like to see Nasser’s deflation brought about. But they seem unanimous in feeling that the Suez is not the issue on which to attempt to do this by force. Under those circumstances, because of the temper of their populations, they say they would have to support Nasser even against their better judgment.

Seldom, I think, have we been faced by so grave a problem. For the time being we must, I think, put our faith in the processes already at work to bring Nasser peacefully to accept the solution along the lines of the 18-nation proposal. I believe that even though this procedure may fail to give the setback to Nasser that he so much deserves, we can better retrieve our position subsequently than if military force were hastily invoked.⁵

Of course, our departments are looking into the implications of all future developments. In this they will keep in close touch with appropriate officials of your Government, as is my wish.

With warm regard,

As ever,

D.E.⁶

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Transmitted Priority to London in telegram 1593, September 2, 5:37 p.m., which is the source text. At President Eisenhower’s request, copies were also sent on September 2 for background purposes to Ambassador Dillon (telegram 827 to Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/9–256) and to Henderson (telegram 623 to Cairo; ibid., 974.7301/9–256). Barbour reported that the message was delivered at 12:15 p.m., London time, September 3. (Telegram 1266 from London, September 3; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

   Late in the afternoon of August 31, Hoover forwarded to President Eisenhower a suggested reply to Eden, which Dulles apparently had drafted while en route to Duck Island. (Note from Hoover to Eisenhower with attachments; Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–3156 and Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) Eisenhower made, in his own hand, extensive changes on this draft reply. (Ibid.) A clean version of the text, which incorporated Eisenhower’s revisions, was typed on September 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–3156 and Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File) After that, Dulles and Hoover made a few additional changes, which were added by hand to both copies of the September 1 draft. The major revisions, which Eisenhower made to Dulles’ original draft, are indicated in footnotes below.

2. For text of Eisenhower’s statement of August 29, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 716–717.
3. At this point, Eisenhower deleted the following sentence in Dulles’ original draft: “Although I can see that this thesis provides, as you say, a reason to continue your military preparations in conjunction with the French, the actual use of force is another matter.” In its place, Eisenhower inserted the paragraph printed here. A few changes were made subsequently, including the addition of the first sentence, “I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point onward our views on this situation diverge.” Also, the fifth sentence in the text printed here originally read in Eisenhower’s draft: “I must tell you frankly that American public opinion flatly rejects the thought of using force until every possible peaceful means of protecting our vital interests has been exhausted without result.”
4. At this point, Dulles’ original draft reads: “I quite agree that Nasser definitely needs deflating. And we also have friends in the Middle East who tell us they would like to see this brought about. But they seem unanimous in feeling that the Suez is not the issue on which to attempt to do this by force. Under those circumstances, they say they would have to support Nasser even against their better judgment.” Eisenhower inserted instead the remainder of the paragraph printed here and the entirety of the next one with one minor subsequent change. In Eisenhower’s original draft the third sentence read: “In my view, these two problems need not and possibly cannot be solved simultaneously and by the same means.”
5. In Dulles’ original draft, this sentence reads: “I believe that even though this procedure may seem to give Nasser a partial victory, we can better retrieve our position subsequently than if military force is invoked.” Eisenhower’s version is that which appears in text printed here.
6. Telegram 1593 bears these typed initials.