15. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, White House, Washington, July 28, 1956, 10 a.m.1
Principal points developed in the discussion of Acting Secretary Hoover and Deputy Under Secretary Murphy with the President this morning are set out below.
Mr. Hoover said that in talking to Secretary Dulles this morning2 he had suggested a general line of holding down developments for the present, discouraging French and British suggestions of early armed action, and that he understood Secretary Dulles tended to agree. The President referred to British worries over possible loss of international position through other Mid-Eastern countries challenging British interests.
In discussion of a report that the French favored arming the Israelis, there was agreement that for the present it is desirable not to mix the present problem with the Israeli question.
The President did not think the means that would be required for Western countries to go in and operate the Canal would be very great at the present time, but said it is a question whether there is a basis for such action in terms of world opinion. The problem arises that, lacking intervention now, the Canal operations may gradually deteriorate without giving a specific occasion for intervention at any later time. This has been a deliberate, unilateral seizure, and people around the world are expecting some reaction now. Of course, if there were seizure of the nationals of Western countries, that would give a basis for action later.
There was agreement on the importance of keeping this Government clear of any precipitate action with the French and the British, which might later tie our hands. The President thought that if any sweeping action is taken, it should be not on just a tri-partite basis, but should involve all the maritime powers. He saw considerable merit in having Perkins lay the matter before NATO. Mr. Hoover thought that Mr. Murphy might take up with the French and the British the question of bringing NATO into the problem.
In discussion the President developed an idea that the French and the British might make a statement that they do not recognize the validity of the Egyptian action, that they will continue to operate the Canal, putting the matter before the World Court for determination, and putting tolls in escrow until that determination is [Page 27] made. We might join in such a statement; also the NATO countries might join in it. Basically they would say they would operate as before, and that if Egypt was to bring in the use of force, they would meet it with force of their own. Such a line of action would probably be justified before world opinion. The President thought that if such an announcement were made it would satisfy the requirement for action in the Mid-East to prevent other countries from challenging the West, and would show that the countries having maritime interests are trying to put the matter before an impartial tribunal. He did not consider that the Western world could sit and do nothing, waiting to see whether the operation of the Canal deteriorates. He referred to the provision in the Convention3 providing for the placing of warships by each maritime power at each end of the Canal, and spoke of using them to escort traffic through the Canal.
Mr. Hoover also mentioned his thinking concerning starting a movement of some of the U.S. nationals out of Egypt. He also mentioned Egyptian failure to respond regarding Mr. Hare’s assignment to Egypt.4
Colonel, CE, U S Army
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.↩
- No account of this telephone conversation has been found in Department of State files. According to Dulles’ Appointment Book, it began at 8:35 a.m., Lima time. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)↩
- Reference is presumably to the Constantinople Convention of 1888.↩
- See telegram 61, July 12, vol. XV, p. 822.↩