Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Lima¹

Washington , July 28, 1956—12:43 a.m.

Tedul 20. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. Following are salient events on Suez situation since our noon telephone call:²

1. Eden made strong plea to President for concerted action against Nasser, based upon broad principles of international interest, with stated willingness to back up with military force. (Eden message rpt Lima Tedul 18, July 27).³ At conference with President this afternoon I pointed out grave dangers of engaging in military intervention on grounds outlined by Eden and that while strong position should be taken to preserve Western status in Middle East, I did not believe confiscation of company was in itself sufficient reason for military invasion. Some other overt act would be necessary before we would be justified in adopting such measures. Otherwise our entire posture would be compromised. President agreed. (President’s reply to Eden rpt Lima Tedul 17, July 27)⁴

2. In view forthcoming Eden–Pineau meeting on Sunday, we decided to have Murphy go London arriving there Sunday noon. We are much concerned at reports from London and Paris re inclination toward military measures, and fear that unless we can introduce an element of restraint Eden and Pineau will tend to move much too rapidly and without really adequate cause for armed intervention.

3. Our preliminary thinking is along following lines: (a) Egyptian order that foreign technical personnel (such as pilots) must remain on job under duress of imprisonment may provoke incidents, including possible stoppage of transit, which would provide better basis of intervention; (b) action in name of NATO might be more effective than operation in UN and also more suitable than tripartite measures; (c) firm and positive position by US, UK, France and other interested countries is necessary to prevent loss of other Western assets such as air bases, oil concessions and pipelines.

4. French and Canadians both now appear eager to support Israelis with considerable armament. We believe this could be most dangerous and therefore making every effort have them hold off deals for Mysteres and F–86’s. We are also postponing announcement Operation Stockpile.

5. President has followed events with keen interest and is looking forward to your return early Sunday morning. He fully concurs in our view that we must adopt a firm policy but at same time not jeopardize our long-term posture by precipitate action.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/7–2856. Top Secret; Niact.
2. No account of this telephone conversation has been found in Department of State files.
3. Document 5.
4. See footnote 4, Document 6.