Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

144. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, August 29, 1956, 9:30 a.m.¹

Washington, August 29, 1956, 9:30 a.m.

(1) Suez. I outlined to the President my talks with the British, particularly those with Eden, Macmillan, Salisbury, and Lloyd, indicating the British were determined to move militarily unless there was a clear acceptance of the 18-Power plan by Nasser by around the 10th of September. I said that Eden had indicated that their military planning would have to take a definite and irrevocable status by about that time and could not be left appreciably longer in a state of indecision.

The President raised the question of the attitude of the Labor Party and I said that this did involve a question mark. I said I felt that Gaitskell’s open opposition to the Government policy was not in the interest of the peaceful solution because it was apt to encourage Nasser to feel that he could reject with impunity, and there then might come incidents or action which would in fact precipitate hostilities which the Labor Party could not prevent.

I referred to the contrast in the British position from our position in relation to Taiwan, where there had been virtual unanimity.

I said that my own belief was that it would be very difficult to disengage the talks with Nasser in accordance with Eden’s timetable, and that in fact the British might be drawn into a situation where they would have to accept a result which, while reasonably safeguarding the Canal, would not give the blow to Nasser’s prestige which the British and French felt indispensable because of their positions in the Middle East and North Africa respectively.

I said that the British were also thinking in terms of possible Security Council action and that again might get them into a situation from which they could not readily disengage for the purposes of hostilities.

The President raised the question as to whether there was anything we could do to help bring about acceptance of the 18-Power proposal by Nasser. I said I thought it might be a good idea if he would issue a statement indicating, with his personal authority, support for the 18-Power proposal. The President agreed with this and I then dictated the draft of such a statement. By the time it was typed out, Admiral Radford joined us and a copy was shown to him. A few suggestions were made and the statement then agreed upon with the understanding that I would read it to the press and television.²

(2) We discussed Eden’s letter received on August 27,³ and it was agreed that I would draft a suggested reply.

[Here follows discussion relating to China, Panama, and personnel matters. For text of the discussion on Panama, see volume VII, page 302.]

(7) I referred to the confidential trip of Bob Anderson to Saudi Arabia and said I thought the President would find it both interesting and instructive to hear a report from him.

[Here follows discussion of Yugoslavia and Germany.]

JFD

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. Following the Republican Convention, President Eisenhower remained in California for several days. He returned to Washington at 8:30 p.m. on August 28. (Record of the President’s Daily Appointments; Eisenhower Library)
2. Eisenhower’s statement was issued as a White House press release later that day. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 716–717; or Department of State Bulletin, September 10, 1956, p. 405.
3. Document 137.