Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

145. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, August 29, 1956—2 p.m.

1147 Suez—From Henderson.

1. We are sure Dept realizes after reading our various telegrams that one of perplexing problems which Suez Committee facing and which USDel in particular facing is interpretation of phrase contained proposition New Zealand² authorizing Committee in presenting 18 Power statement to “explain its purposes and objectives”. It seems clear that at least British and French Govts, if not various other European govts, take position that Committee has no power “to negotiate” and therefore its discussions with Nasser should be strictly within framework 18 Power statement. These govts apparently fear that if Committee ventures illustrate to Nasser how he could agree to principles set forth in statement without losing too much face, or endeavors through illustrations to impress upon him high degree flexibility in negotiations he will retain even after agreeing to these principles, Committee may advance ideas which would not be acceptable to UK and France and that UK and France might have difficulty in opposing such ideas during negotiations if Nasser should point out that they originated with Suez Committee. It furthermore apparent that UK and France do not believe that Committee has facts and experts at its disposal which would enable it to hold its own in case Nasser should endeavor convert explanations into preliminary negotiations. UK and France are particularly concerned lest explanations should lead to discussions which would be drawn out to considerable length or which may lead to obscuring what seems to them to be clear cut issues. They expect Committee to obtain flat yes or no answer from Nasser quickly with minimum amount of “explanation”.

2. Although Menzies has asserted that Committee should be prepared to give Nasser illustrations as to how principles in statement³ could be applied in manner which would really be to advantage of Egypt as well as to users of Canal, he has thus far made no concrete move in direction of formulating illustrations or asking any member Committee to do so.

3. Members U.S. Delegation staff have nevertheless been devoting considerable time in endeavoring formulate certain illustrations and in fact we have drawn up tentative outlines of plans for operation of Canal in accordance with principles contained in statement. During course of today one such possible outline is being sent to Dept for comment.⁴ We believe this outline close to British thinking, as disclosed their memo handed U.S. Del early London Conference, but British and French may correctly fear this would be first position to be bargained down.

4. Unless we hear otherwise from Dept we shall assume that it desires USDel and Committee not to hesitate in discussion with Nasser to present various suggestions illustrating flexibility which he would have negotiating on basis of principles contained in statement provided he given clearly to understand such illustrations should not be regarded as binding in initial stages upon 18 Powers which Committee represents. We recognize of course that Nasser would nevertheless not hesitate to so use them if suited his advantage.

5. If after discussions Committee finds that Nasser is prepared to cooperate in drawing up “heads of agreement”, Committee will be almost sure to face problem as to whether contents of this document should be limited strictly to principles contained in 18 Power statement or whether it could also include certain details which would no longer be considered as merely illustrative. We doubt Nasser would be prepared approve any “heads of agreement” limited to generalized statement principles of 18-Nation statement. Thus we see little alternative to working out with Nasser at some stage fairly detailed “heads of agreement”, including outline of system, if we are to have any real chance of obtaining agreement from him to move on to formal negotiation on predetermined basis.

Any views which Dept might be able to give us in this regard would be appreciated.

Barbour

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–2956. Secret; Niact. Received at 11:02 a.m.
2. For text of the New Zealand statement, see Document 128.
3. Reference is to Five-Nation Proposal, also known as the Eighteen-Power Proposal; see Document 110.
4. Telegram 1144 from London, August 29, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–1956)