At the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the enclosed views
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject, additional to those
transmitted by the reference memoranda, are transmitted herewith for
the information of the National Security Council in connection with
the studies being developed pursuant to NSC Action No. 1593–b.
Enclosure
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING EXPROPRIATION OF THE SUEZ
MARITIME CANAL COMPANY BY THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT5
A. General
Conclusions:
1. Britain and France are convinced that they cannot accept the
consequences of a further rise in Nasser’s power and prestige and can be expected
to take any action they consider necessary, including military
action, to safeguard their interests.
2. Although Arab League nations generally have expressed
themselves as being in favor of the expropriation of the Suez
Canal Company, they are not uniformly in favor of increasing
further the stature of President Nasser.
3. While the Near East members of the Baghdad Pact were not
expected to officially support the abrupt action of President
Nasser, the action
of Iraq in hailing President Nasser’s seizure may adversely affect the
Iranian and Pakistani views on this subject.
4. Israel will view with satisfaction any action which will
discredit Egypt in the eyes of the Western World. Israel will
probably contend that the abrupt action of Egypt provides
justification for increased shipment of arms to Israel.
5. The USSR has publicly
applauded Nasser’s
action and may have influenced his decision. It is to the USSR’s advantage to upset the
West’s equilibrium in any way possible. It is within the realm
of possibility that the USSR
and Egypt will announce a mutual defense or mutual security pact
within the next few days.
6. Unsuccessful U.S. military action would be most damaging and
must not be permitted to occur. Accordingly, the United States
must be prepared to commit whatever forces may be required to
bring its military intervention to a successful conclusion.
B. Conclusions on the
Implication of this Situation to the United States from the
Military Point of View are as Follows:
7. The war-making potential of the NATO powers would be seriously affected by the
interruption of the movement of vital raw
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materials through the Canal. It is
militarily unacceptable to the United States and NATO for this movement to be
controlled by a power which is hostile or potentially hostile to
the Western Powers.
8. If Egypt closes the canal, the movement through the Suez Canal
of raw materials for Western use will have to be rerouted with
resultant delays, increased shipping costs, and a demand for
ocean freighters and tankers which exceeds the current
availability.
9. If the Suez Canal, the Trans-Arabian pipelines and Iraq
Petroleum Company pipelines were closed, but crude oil from the
Persian Gulf continues to be available, it would have the
following implications to the Western Powers:
- a.
- Necessity for the introduction of national and
international controls on petroleum consumption.
- b.
- Crude oil production would have to be increased in the
United States and Canada by 1.3 million B/D, the Caribbean by
200,000 B/D, and the
Persian Gulf by 500,000 B/D to maintain Western Europe’s present
demand.
- c.
- The United States and Caribbean could meet the
increased crude oil production for the first 90 days;
beyond that point doubt exists if this increased
production could be maintained for an extended period.
In any case, serious depletion of Western Hemisphere oil
reserves would result.
10. If the Suez Canal, Trans-Arabian pipeline and Iraq Petroleum
pipelines were closed and no crude oil was available from the
Persian Gulf there would be an immediate shortage of
approximately 3.1 million B/D to
the Free World, particularly Western Europe, which can be met
only partially by rationing and additional production from other
sources.
11. Military action by either the United Kingdom, France, or
United States will probably require a withdrawal of forces from
NATO commitment and thus
temporarily weaken the military posture in Western Europe.
However, this is considered of small consequence when compared
to the long-term economic effect on NATO and the loss of Western prestige and influence
in the Middle East.
12. If Nasser emerges as
the apparent victor in his contest with the West, the following
consequences may be anticipated:
- a.
- The resultant decrease in Western prestige could
result in the loss of U.S. bases in the Middle East and
North Africa and ultimately in other areas such as
Iceland, the Philippine Republic, Spain and the
Azores.
- b.
- The rebellion against the French in North Africa will
gain new impetus.
- c.
- The governments and leaders of Middle East countries
who have identified themselves with U.S. policies will
be seriously weakened.
- d.
- Other Moslem governments would come under increasing
pressure to expropriate Western investments in oil
fields and pipelines.
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Concessions to the USSR on the part of the
nations concerned would be a logical corollary to such
acts of expropriation. Were these granted, the result
would be an acceleration of Soviet expansion and a
consolidation of Soviet power throughout the Middle
East.
- e.
- The likelihood of Arab military action against Israel
would be considerably increased and vice versa.
- f.
- Iraqi participation in the Baghdad Pact might become
so slight that the Pact would be seriously
weakened.
C. Conclusions on the Extent
and Nature of Measures Required to Support U.K. (or UK.-French) Military Action without Commitment
of U.S. Forces are as Follows:
13. United States could lend support by public endorsement of
United Kingdom/French military action in the Suez and by an
unqualified commitment to intervene militarily in case third
parties come to the assistance of the Egyptians.
14. United States could provide certain needed critical raw
materials to the United Kingdom-French for the period of time
that the Suez Canal is closed by hostile action.
15. United States could provide increased economic support and
financial aid to the United Kingdom and France.
16. United States could provide military supplies and equipment
as required by the United Kingdom and France to guarantee the
successful seizure and holding of the canal area.
17. United States could eliminate economic aid to Egypt and
freeze all additional Egyptian assets which are in the United
States.
18. United States could provide more active support to the
Baghdad Pact, including adherence, to counter the rise of Arab
nationalism. Steps might include: (a) prompt and resolute U.S.
adherence to the Pact; (b) a substantial increase in military
assistance to the Pact countries; and (c) stepped-up economic
aid.
D. Conclusions on United
States Participation in Combined Direct Military
Action:
19. Assuming that third parties do not intervene militarily on
behalf of Egypt, the U.S. contribution toward combined military
forces might be on the order of:
- a.
- Army—1 Division
Reinforced.
- b.
-
Navy—1 Fast Carrier Task
Force
1 Amphibious Task Group including a Marine Regimental
Landing Team and supporting Air Component
- c.
-
Air Force—Air Div Hq
1 Fighter Bomber Wing
1 Tactical Reconnaissance Sqdn Airlift as required
and as practicable
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E. Conclusions on Untied
Stales Unilateral Action to Protect US. Nationals.
20. The forces required would be as follows:
- a.
- Army—Army Regimental Combat
Team (RCT) Service
support units as necessary
- b.
-
Navy—Present Sixth Fleet
forces (plus augmentation from WESTLANT) Persian
Gulf–Red Sea Forces
1 Air Transport Detachment MSTS and amphibious shipping for Army
Units, if necessary.
- c.
-
Air Force—1 Fighter-Bomb
Squadron alerted in Europe
1 Reconnaissance Flight (6 A/C alerted in Europe) Airlift for above
Army units, if ordered 6 C–119’s, if
required
