Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez
Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI
50. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of Defense (Robertson) to the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)1
Washington
,
August 2,
1956
.
SUBJECT
- Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company by the
Egyptian Government
- 1.
- Forwarded herewith are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
with respect to the above subject, which I should like to make
available for the information of the members of the National
Security Council.
- 2.
- I fully concur in the gravity of the implications of the
recent Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal
Company, as outlined by the JCS,
and I feel that the points raised by them in their memorandum
merit the most careful analysis and consideration. In this
connection I believe that all feasible political and economic
measures should be taken before a decision is made to resort to
the use of military force. I recommend that the members of the
NSC be prepared to discuss
these issues at such time as the Suez Canal situation may be
brought before the Council.
Reuben B.
Robertson, Jr.
2
[Page 117]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
Defense (Wilson)3
Washington
,
July 31, 1956
SUBJECT
- Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company by the
Egyptian Government
- 1.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned with the
implications of the recent Egyptian nationalization of the
Suez Maritime Canal Company. They consider this Egyptian
action to be militarily detrimental to the United States and
its Allies. Among the military implications of this action
are those affecting the continued United States control of
military bases and facilities in the general area; the
future of the Baghdad Pact Organization; the economic and
military strength of European nations and therefore of
NATO; the French
position in North Africa; the free flow of shipping through
the Suez Canal; and those affecting the United States
security interests if Nasser’s arbitrary action is tolerated and a
further precedent for such arbitrary action thereby
established.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this Egyptian action,
with its attendant implications, to be of such importance as
to require action by the United States and its Allies which
can reasonably be expected to result in placing the Suez
Canal under a friendly and responsible authority at the
earliest practicable date. Furthermore, they believe that,
if action short of the use of military force cannot
reasonably be expected to achieve this result, the United
States should consider the desirability of taking military
action in support of the U.K., France and others as appropriate. They are
aware that the matter is receiving full consideration by
other governmental Departments, but would emphasize their
conviction that promptness in reaching an early decision and
of taking definite and appropriate action is particularly
important in this instance.
- 3.
- In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
strongly recommend that the Secretary of Defense request the
National Security Council (NSC), as a matter of urgency, to formulate and
[Page 118] direct the
early implementation of appropriate courses of action
designed to assure that the Suez Canal comes under the
control of a friendly and responsible authority and that the
danger of future actions elsewhere, of the nature of Egypt’s
expropriation of the canal is minimized. In this connection,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that there is an urgent
requirement for the NSC to
determine whether the western world can reasonably expect to
obtain the necessary results without recourse to military
action by any western power. Concurrently the NSC should appraise the
desirability of a U.S. guarantee to give political and
economic support to military action by the U.K., whether taken alone or in
concert with France, while abstaining, ourselves, from
direct military participation; and of a public commitment to
prompt direct military participation by U.S. forces in the
event that third parties intervene militarily on behalf of
the Egyptians.
- 4.
- If there is reasonable assurance that non-military actions
will achieve the necessary results promptly, it is
preferable to avoid military action by any of the nations
concerned. However, timely U.S. action in this situation is
believed to be so vital that, pending the outcome of the
NSC study, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff are conducting further military studies on:
- a.
- The implications of this situation to the United
States from the military point of view.
- b.
- The extent and nature of measures required to
support U.K. (or
U.K.-French)
military action without commitment of U.S.
forces.
- c.
- What U.S. military forces will be required if the
United States participates in combined direct
military action.
- d.
- The military forces required if the United States
is forced to take unilateral military action to
protect U.S. nationals.
- 5.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out that Israel
may be tempted to capitalize on the situation by taking
unilateral action inimical to U.S. interests. Any such
unilateral action should be prevented.
- 6.
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not participate
in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this
memorandum.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D.
Taylor
4
General, United
States Army Chief of Staff