Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

84. Memorandum to Washington¹

Cairo, February 8, 1956.

SUBJECT

• The Problem of Tension Between the Arab States and Israel: Obstacle to Settlement

1. Atmosphere of Tension. The atmosphere of tension and mutual suspicion which has prevailed between Egypt and Israel since the Gaza raid of February 1955 and prevailed with varying intensity elsewhere along the armistice lines since the end of the Palestine War must be recognized as a primary obstacle to the settlement of the differences between the Arab States and Israel. Furthermore, it is an obstacle both to private and public discussion in consideration of a settlement. The elimination of this atmosphere is unquestionably the first step to be accomplished if a settlement of differences and the establishment of peace is to be achieved in the area.

2. Effect of Situation on Capabilities of Governments. The prevailing atmosphere of tension seriously limits the freedom of action of the governments of the area.

a. The Israeli Government is reliably reported to be influenced in its policy and propaganda by the fact that much of the Israeli population is frightened of infiltrators from across the armistice lines. The policy of retaliatory raids, aside from the moral questions involved, is apparently influenced by the political considerations and the fear of the Israeli Government that it would lose popular support if it did not give some indication of its willingness to use force in defense of the Israeli people. It is also reliably reported that the course of world events in recent months has appeared to be unfavorable to Israel. Many Israelis have feared that the increase of Arab strength and the threat of Soviet-communist penetration of the area would lead the West to force the Israeli Government to make compromises, particularly territorial compromises. In order to counteract the political losses which these widespread fears have threatened, the Israeli Government, it is reported, has felt it necessary to carry on propaganda which insists on the Government’s unwillingness to yield on any point.

b. The Arab Governments, since the end of the Palestine War, have been faced with the problem of satisfying the intense desire of many Arabs for revenge. Any attempt on the part of Arab leaders to modify bitterness toward Israel has tended to weaken their political position. The exercise of restraint on the part of Arab leaders has frequently been in the past cause for attacks upon them by their political opponents. The prevailing atmosphere of tension is largely responsible for limitations of this sort upon Arab leaders.

3. Factors Responsible for the Prevailing Atmosphere of Tension. The atmosphere which prevails along the Arab-Israeli armistice lines is not the product of isolated events or public statements, but is compounded of thousands of interacting events against the background of the Palestine War. Certain factors, however, can be pointed out as being particularly responsible for the present atmosphere.

a. Military Raids. The execution of organized military operations across the armistice lines and bringing about the death of both civilian and military personnel is, unquestionably, one of the major causes of the present atmosphere. Such raids terrorize the population along the border, stamp the government responsible for them as aggressive and warlike in its intentions and methods, and raise questions both as to its long range objectives and as to its relationship with its public. The action of the United Nations in repeatedly condemning the Israeli Government for military raids across the armistice lines, without regard for their retaliatory character, is clear evidence of world opinion. The cessation of military raids is an essential requisite of an atmosphere in which a peaceful settlement can be carried out.

b. Infiltration. The illegal crossing of the armistice lines by small groups or individuals for whatever purpose adds to the atmosphere of tension and suspicion, particularly when such infiltration is for the purpose of theft or harassment and when it leads to clashes, often resulting in the death of innocent persons. It must be recognized that most infiltrators in the past have been refugees, often innocently seeking a brief look at their former homes. However, many of them have engaged in theft and have been prepared to use force in order to extricate themselves from difficulties. Others, of course, are nomads over whom no government has effective authority or control. Nevertheless, the seriousness of this practice as a factor in the prevailing atmosphere cannot be discounted.

c. Public Policy. Statements and public policy, or statements which appear to be public policy, made by the leaders of the Arab States or of Israel and which involve threats to the other side contribute to a general state of tension. The statements by Israeli leaders favoring expansion of Israeli borders or threatening Arab States with further military retaliation and statements by Arab leaders referring to a future time in which the Arabs will be able to destroy Israel all contribute to the state of tension. Propaganda which arouses suspicion and hatred of the other side also contributes another obstacle to any effort to solve the overall problem.

4. The Problem of Change. The problem which confronts all people on both sides of the armistice lines who are interested in bringing an end to the fruitless conflicts of the present situation and creating a situation in which peaceful progress and growth are possible is one of breaking out of the vicious circle of hostile actions and the hatred that comes in response and finding some formula for change. It appears almost certain that no formula for change can ever come as a result of resolving the problem of guilt and responsibility for the past. The strands of justice and injustice are so inextricably intertwined that there is probably now no solution on grounds of justice. The alternative is a solution on grounds of self interest and convenience.

5. Establishment of Mutual Confidence. Both sides recognize that before a formula for an agreed settlement can be devised or even discussed in face to face negotiation, it will be necessary to take the first step of lessening tensions. This will require the establishment of mutual confidence; mutual confidence, however, can come only as a result of positive acts and the withholding of actions which have in the past contributed to the vicious circle of aggression and hatred.

6. Specific Measures for the Establishment of Mutual Confidence.

a. Border Control.

(1) Cessation of Military Raids. Total cessation of military raids across the armistice lines must be regarded as a requisite to the easing of tensions.

(2) Measures to Reduce and Control Infiltration. A gradual and increasing stiffening of orders to border military and police forces for the control of infiltration is probably a necessity. Some carefully devised explanations for this step must be devised. Punishment of infiltrators, admittedly extremely difficult under present circumstances, probably should be organized. It would probably help for the Arab States to see that a report on the whole problem of control of infiltration and on measures being taken to control it be passed to the Israeli side.

(3) Measures to Reduce Contact Between Troops. Further efforts should be made to devise plans for the mutual withdrawal of troops a fixed distance behind armistice lines. Any other methods for reducing troop contact along the armistice lines should be discussed and, if possible, forwarded to the other side through some intermediary.

b. Propaganda.

(1) Suspicion [Suspension] of Propaganda Statements and Techniques Which Contribute to the State of Tension. An obvious requisite of an improved atmosphere is the suspicion [suspension] of propaganda statements attacking the government or people on the other side of the armistice lines, impugning their motives or accusing them of immoral or unjust plans and aspirations. It is not to be expected that all unfriendly statements against the other side could be quickly eliminated from propaganda from either side, but a progressive program for the elimination of statements which serve only to stir up the public against the other side must immediately be instituted if tensions are to be discussed.

(2) Positive Propaganda Measures. After steps have been taken to eliminate or reduce propaganda aimed solely at creating an antagonism, a program of positive propaganda aimed at producing an atmosphere favorable to the acceptance of a settlement must be instituted. Such a propaganda program must be made the subject of careful study, which must begin immediately.

(3) Public Policy Statements. A change in the tenor of the public policy statements should be carried out as rapidly as possible in order to prepare the way for an eventual announcement of a settlement. At the beginning it will, of course, not be possible for any public official to make any direct recommendation of a settlement or a statement indicating support, in general, of the idea of the settlement, but public policy statements can from the beginning show approval for the objectives of a settlement, that is, peace, the end of fear, the opportunity to devote the maximum amount of public resources to internal development, etc. In time, public policy statements can be made on the various measures for the achievement of those objectives. It must be acknowledged that statements similar to those described above have been made in the past. However, what must be sought now is a progressive program, so devised and so adhered to that the statement favoring peace and the devotion of resources to economic development today is not cancelled out by a statement looking forward to successful war tomorrow.

TIMETABLE

Step 1: 1st Anderson Mission.

To obtain statement of intent from both parties and assurances of interest in a settlement necessary for U.S. President to take further measures.

Step 2: 2nd Anderson Mission.

To report to both sides on discussions with the U.S. President, to bring a statement of plans and intentions from the U.S. President and, if a settlement appears possible, to obtain agreement on Step 3.

Step 3: Inauguration of systematic program using the United Nations as a vehicle for the reduction of tensions between Arab States and Israel.

The United Nations would not be informed in any way of the existence of secret preparations for a settlement, but would be “used” by the United States in concert with Nasser for the purposes below.

A. To Gain Time

1. To enable us to work out the details of the final settlement.

2. To enable both sides to prepare public opinion for the eventual announcement of the settlement.

B. To provide a changed international atmosphere with regard to the Arab-Israel problem.

1. To which the Arab States could respond favorably, and

2. Which Israel could not ignore without a decisive loss of outside support.

Step 4: Complete Staff Work on the Actual Terms of Settlement.

Israel and Egypt, acting independently, will begin this immediately upon the inauguration of Step 3 and will push ahead with it as rapidly as circumstances permit.

Step 5: Egyptian Prime Minister will initiate program to bring other Arab leaders into line for purpose of working out Arab terms and arriving at eventual settlement.

This step will begin whenever the effects of Step 3 make it feasible.

Step 6: Meetings of Authorized Representatives of the Chiefs of State.

This step to begin when staff work has been completed. The purpose of meetings will be to finalize the arrangements for the settlement.

Step 7: Meetings of the Chiefs of State.

To complete negotiations and come to agreement.

Step 8: Announcement of the Agreement and of Steps to be Taken to Implement the Agreement.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret. The original text was handed to Ali Sabri on February 8. (Message 101, March 2; Ibid.)