Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

56. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 31, 1956, 2:40 p.m.¹

ETW MC–5

Washington, January 31, 1956, 2:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • President Eisenhower
  • (where indicated)
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Under Secretary Hoover
  • Ambassador Aldrich
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Mr. Procknow
  • Governor Stassen
  • Mr. Reuben Robertson
  • Admiral Radford
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Wilcox
  • Mr. Allen
  • Mr. Bowie
  • Mr. Hagerty (in part)
  • Mr. Goodkind
  • Mr. Timmons
  • Mr. Lister
  • Mr. Cottman
• UK
  • Prime Minister Eden
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Ambassador Makins
  • Sir Harold Caccia
  • Sir Leslie Rowan
  • Sir Hubert Graves
  • Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Ian Samuel

[Here follow a list of subjects discussed and discussion of unrelated matters.]

Arab-Israeli Dispure

The Secretary said that our military people had been asked to review the possibility of military action in the area in order to prevent or control possible hostilities. He asked Admiral Radford to comment on this point.

Admiral Radford said that he and General Whiteley had studied this question and had concluded that both countries have naval forces in the area which could be moved if necessary to the Eastern Mediterranean.² We have plenty of resources, particularly naval, to permit us to make a show of force. It might be difficult, however, to obtain wide public awareness of any action since it is widely known that we have considerable naval strength in the Mediterranean. Our naval forces alone could establish an effective maritime blockade of Israel, and with a few reinforcements in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, we could blockade Egypt also.

The President inquired whether it would be possible to arrange for naval visits to number of ports in the area. Admiral Radford confirmed that this could be done.

The Prime Minister suggested that, if we say anything about these discussions, we should reaffirm our 1950 Tripartite Declaration and state that we have had further talks in Washington concerning this problem.

Mr. Lloyd suggested that we add the information that military dispositions could be made, that we give the appearance of concentrating on the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, perhaps by moving aircraft carriers and other naval vessels.

The President turned to the Secretary and said that this raised serious questions of policy which should be discussed with Congressional leaders. He said that perhaps the Secretary, alone or with him, should do this, pointing out that it is imperative that we take all possible steps to keep the peace in this area. The President noted, however, that Congressional leaders would probably ask why we did not operate through the United Nations.

The Secretary commented that such a move would probably give the Soviets a chance to move into the picture.

The President said that we should probably send naval vessels into the Eastern Mediterranean in such a way that it looked as though they were on special missions such as mapping. Make it appear, he suggested, that they are on secret business and not just out to make a show of force.

The Secretary noted that this might be effective if the moves were coupled with these discussions in Washington.

The Prime Minister stated that the Arabs and Israelis know that we have the necessary means at our disposal. What we must do, he said, is make them realize we are prepared to make some use of our capabilities.

The President reiterated that before saying or doing very much, it would be necessary for us to consult Congressional leaders.

The Secretary noted that the latter would certainly raise a number of questions. If our bluff does not work, he said, we must be prepared to say what we would do next.

The President commented that if we work through the United Nations on this problem, the Soviets would no doubt be happy to jump in and send some of their own ships into the area.

The Secretary inquired as to how quickly a naval blockade would be effective.

Admiral Radford replied that its effect would be immediate and quite complete on Israel and effective but less immediate on Egypt.

The Secretary then referred to UN Resolution 378³ and said that this might be helpful in determining who is the guilty party in any particular situation.

Mr. Lloyd suggested that we could say that we adhere to the 1950 Tripartite Declaration and would take action both inside and outside the United Nations. This might be very effective when coupled with a show of force.

The President stated that to say we have discussed the various possibilities, including a show of force, would be about as far as we can go. He reminded the British representatives that only Congress could take action which would involve the United States in war.

The Secretary referred again to the 1950 Tripartite Declaration and said that the developments feared at that time were even more likely today. He indicated that the US and UK should discuss what steps might be taken, including a show of force, and repeated that this would have to be discussed with Congressional leaders. We should tell them of our problems and ask for their ideas, he added.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that the possible moves just discussed would be better than providing more arms for Israel. He asked whether it was not likely that the Israelis would agree with this analysis.

The Secretary replied that they would probably not favor such a course if they want a preventive war.

Admiral Radford said that Egyptian military capabilities are not very impressive at the present time but will probably increase considerably following delivery of jet aircraft, tanks and other equipment from the Soviet bloc. He said that the Israelis hold a preponderance of strength in the Gaza area.

The President asked if there was agreement that one or two naval vessels might be sent into the Eastern Mediterranean.

Admiral Radford stated that this could be done in such a way that the action would receive public notice. He suggested we might also consider sending naval vessels into the Red Sea.

The Under Secretary agreed that this would be a good idea.

The President said that the main thing is for us to show clearly that we are giving urgent study to the dangerous situation existing in the area and are considering steps which might be open to us.

The Prime Minister agreed and said that we should consider the words to be used in describing our position and that the question of action to be taken should be discussed with General Whiteley.⁴

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7. No other drafting information is given on the source text. According to an account by Goodpaster, the conversation took place in the Cabinet Room. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) There is a note on the source text identical to the one on Document 54; see footnote 1 thereto.
2. See footnote 3, supra.
3. Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 378 (V), entitled “Duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities”. The General Assembly adopted this measure at its 308th plenary meeting on November 17, 1950. For text, see U.N. doc. A/1775.
4. See Document 70.