Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

462. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Ambassador (Makins) and the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur), Department of State, Washington, July 16, 1956¹

Washington, July 16, 1956

SUBJECT

• Operation Stockpile

Sir Roger Makins called on me this morning at 10 o’clock at my request. I gave to Sir Roger a copy of the attached memorandum of July 16 indicating that the US did not wish contingent planning with respect to Operation Stockpile to be treated as a part of other US/UK contingent military planning for the Middle East nor within the context of the Tripartite Declaration.

Sir Roger was familiar with Admiral Denny’s memorandum of July 5 to Admiral Radford.² He read the memorandum which I handed him and said he fully understood that we were handling this matter outside regular channels and he fully understood why we did not wish it to be a part of US/UK or tripartite contingent planning. He said he would pass the memorandum on to his Government, and felt quite sure they would understand. He added that the British fully agreed that contingent planning with respect to Operation Stockpile, as well as other US/UK contingent military planning for the Middle East, was being handled on a most secret US/UK basis and that the French were not being brought into the picture. He said he would let Admiral Denny know of our talk this morning and the contents of the piece of paper which I had given him.

I also said to Ambassador Makins that if we ever had to implement Operation Stockpile, we might try to make the turn-over of planes in Greece rather than in Cyprus because of the strain which the operation might place on the fairly limited resources in Cyprus. This, however, was simply a possibility which I wished him to know about, and we would only make a decision about this in the event we should decide to implement the delivery of the F–86’s. I said that even though this was a possibility, we still wished to go ahead on the basis of contingent planning for the hand-over in Cyprus. Ambassador Makins said he would make personal note of this but did not plan to pass this word on to London since it might simply confuse them.

I also said to Sir Roger that as I had told him when I originally discussed this operation with him, we might wish at some time to make a general statement about Operation Stockpile to serve as a deterrent. Such a statement would not, of course, mention Cyprus or the details of our contingent military planning. If we at some future date decided to make a general statement, I said to Sir Roger that I would let him know in advance of the issuance of any such statement.

[Attachment]

Memorandum From the Department of State to the British Embassy³

Washington, July 16, 1956.

With reference to paragraph 5 of Admiral Denny’s memorandum of July 5 to Admiral Radford, the President on April 9, 1956, in connection with the tense Middle East situation, announced that “… the United States is likewise determined to support and assist any nation which might be subjected to such aggression …”.⁴ The United States contingent planning with respect to the possible provision to Israel of a number of F–86 aircraft is to place the United States Government in a position to implement the President’s April 9 statement should this become necessary.

The United States does not believe that this contingent planning should be treated as a part of the US/UK contingent military planning which has been in progress since last April with respect to possible operations against an aggressor in the Middle East. Although it has a bearing on certain aspects of such US/UK contingent planning, it is not in the first instance being dealt with by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in its corporate entity but is being handled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The United States believes that knowledge of the possibility that the United States might provide Israel with F–86 planes in the event of aggression against Israel should be restricted to the United States and the United Kingdom. This procedure is, of course, not intended to suggest that if implementation of this plan becomes necessary it could not be done within the context of the Tripartite Declaration. The United States believes that the exact context in which this operation would be carried out (i.e., as a US action with British support and approval through use of the facilities in Cyprus; as a bilateral US/UK operation; as an implementation of the Tripartite Declaration; or in support of a possible UN Resolution) can only be determined by the conditions existing at the time when such an operation might be put into effect. In the interim, the United States attaches the highest importance to secrecy and to limiting knowledge of this operation, as well as the US/UK contingent military planning for possible operations against an aggressor, to the smallest practicable number of persons in the United States and United Kingdom Governments on a need-to-know basis.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, …. Top Secret. Drafted by MacArthur. Copies were sent to Dulles, Hoover, Murphy, Bowie, Russell, Burdett, and Elbrick.
2. Document 423.
3. Top Secret.
4. Ellipses in the source text. See footnote 2, Document 258.