451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1
30. Israel Ambassador saw Secretary tenth.2 Eban opened by summarizing present situation NE, emphasizing military strength displayed by Egypt at evacuation ceremonies June 20. Two major factors in NE were dramatic growth of USSR influence; concomitant growth of Nasser threat to independence of NE states. Eban authorized by Israel PriMin indicate Israel willingness cooperate with US in safeguarding independence NE states—not only Israel but others. Other disturbing developments included growing turbulence frontier with Jordan. Eban asked US support of UN efforts tranquilize [Page 826] border. New Egyptian restrictions on Suez Canal. Israel might be raising this in SC.
Eban continued there were two ill-considered ideas current about present situation in NE. One was Selwyn Lloyd’s statement in Parliament that military balance in area now in Israel’s favor.3 Actually Israel inferior in armor and air strength. There had been suggestion in US press and elsewhere that in seeking arms from US Israel was attempting identify US with Israel. This also untrue. Israel’s objective in seeking arms from US pragmatic, not attempt embarrass US foreign relations.
Israel efforts procure arms Canada and France had come up against attitude those countries could take no action unless US associated itself by example. Similar attitudes indicated on part Italians, British, French.
Eban mentioned continuing Israel interest in EXIM loan for water development and asked if it could be stated to Bank that Department is sympathetic and wished approval. Also requested US FY 1957 economic aid and PL 480 programs in Israel take into account massive demands on Israel economy of present military effort.
In course of reply Secretary stated he not sure US would disagree with analysis of NE situation stated by Selwyn Lloyd. According to best US information there had not yet developed serious disparity favoring Egypt or Arabs generally. Israel’s own military strength had improved over past months. Egypt assimilating new weapons at slower rate than either Israel or others had predicted. As for air defenses, Secretary knew of no way in which Israel could get sure protection from sudden air attack. US always felt Israel must rely on other deterrents which US was in part ready to provide. Eban asked if it were known in area what US would do in event of aggression against Israel. Secretary felt it was known that aggressive action would risk US response. Eban felt US position should be clarified so that it could have full effect as deterrent to would-be aggressor. Secretary replied we were giving this possibility most careful study.
Re Canadian arms sales to Israel, Secretary’s information was that Canadian PriMin had in mind organizing pool of Western powers (not necessarily including US) among which arms shipments to Israel would be allocated. Was not sure US sale to Israel would [Page 827] precipitate favorable Canadian action. In any event. Secretary would be seeing Canadian FonMin shortly and would look into situation.
Re EXIM loan Secretary stated there no broad objection to principle that Israel should be in position borrow money from EXIM Bank.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1256. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Dulles. Pouched to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Ottawa, Paris, and Rome.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 445.↩
- Reference is to a statement by Selwyn Lloyd on July 2 in the House of Commons in response to questions about the British Government’s policy of exporting arms to Egypt. For text, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 555, cols. 988–990.↩