447. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
60. As Nasser’s time limited last night between functions, discussion with him on Palestine problem lasted only about 25 minutes. He had talked to Fawzi and knew of London’s initial response as given by Trevelyan earlier in day. Nasser said he was afraid Fawzi had given us too much hope and he had not known until yesterday morning Fawzi had been so specific. He seemed also a bit irked that Fawzi had had Hussein present in his discussion with me.2
He said he had told Fawzi he afraid timing was not right. He then launched into general discussion of matters in Arab world, including agitated state of emotions and public opinion generally, particularly in northern states with emphasis on Jordan. He very strongly gave impression that nothing positive could be accomplished in Jordan in near future.
I asked if he thought all these factors should preclude secret talks of some kind. He said “perhaps not” but he was not sure of basis on which to proceed. I told him I had impression from Fawzi he thinking of no public action until possibly early next year. Could he foresee that emotions could be calmed down and other things could be right in that time period? He said perhaps but doubted anyone could be sure now. He then said “you Americans always think I am trying to deceive you. I want you to know right now that I am not hopeful that positive results could be obtained at this time”.
During call on Fawzi on other matter late last night, I raised subject with him and told him had found President not very optimistic. Fawzi said he had warned us that this was matter which could only be explored and that both of us might have timing problem. However, he thought we should go ahead and explore it from our side and they would do same. He did not feel it wise to just let matter remain dormant. I asked in view Nasser’s lack of optimism if he thought effort should be made just now through some secret procedure. He said he thought so but concluded we should probably all do no more than restudy problem until Hammarskjold’s arrival here on July 21. He thought at that time he would talk to Hammarskjold as he had to us and see what Hammarskjold’s reaction was. Perhaps after single discussions by Hammarskjold [Page 821] in Israel and Egypt he could have better idea as to how to proceed.
Both Nasser and Fawzi denied categorically that approach suggested had been worked out or even discussed with Moscow. Fawzi himself raised subject, saying he supposed this might be of concern in Washington. He stated that as he inclined to think final action should come through United Nations, he could not see successful results unless Russia were brought into picture at some time prior to United Nations action. He had thought it would be better to place them in a position of accepting a share of the responsibility. Furthermore, if an attempt was made to proceed without Russia, and Russia did not like proposal, he could foresee them working perhaps with other Arab states against proposal.
Toned down a bit by Nasser, Fawzi said everything he had mentioned was completely flexible. I asked Fawzi’s views on one point of procedure. He envisaged initially secret negotiations via third party between Egypt and Israel. This would place Israel in position of negotiating with one Arab state without knowledge of additional demands of other Arab states. How could Tel Aviv proceed with assurances in such an arrangement? Fawzi said this dilemma had always caused him concern. He felt it impossible to bring other Arab states in initially. Therefore, he could see no way out but to proceed as he proposed with our realization that Egypt was not likely to be so foolish as to accept things which it felt could not be sold to other Arab states. He said “this is more our problem than yours and we would be in very difficult position of tight-rope walking”. Egypt did not really like to be in such a position but he could see no other way of taking any initiative.
Am uncertain as to how to evaluate all this. It is not like Fawzi to assume this much initiative. There are many local reasons to lead us to believe that Fawzi and entire Foreign Office have been given orders to work for better relations with West. As Fawzi sees this to be chief stumbling block to such relations it may be under this general instruction that he raised subject on his own. I also feel Nasser may have backed up a bit due to alarm that knowledge of renewed talks on such delicate subject had spread so fast so far. Also there no doubt in my mind that Nasser feels part of his troubles with Washington is his failure to produce settlement in past efforts. He would therefore be over-cautious about giving us another opportunity blame him for raising false hopes.
These discussions have been very informal and have been careful to give no indication of what Department views might be.
Our general feeling is that what Fawzi has in mind is attempt to obtain United Nations action backed by major powers, which would be favorable to Arabs. With such backing he may assume that [Page 822] sufficient pressures could be brought to bear to make Israel acquiesce. There are of course considerable dangers to us in such an approach. It would not be well, as an example, to start down this road if we alone might later have to back out because of Arab demands on Israel. On other hand do not see at this stage that we should walk away, and my conclusion is that we should now wait to see if anything results from Hammarskjold’s visit. Fawzi said he would be glad to see Trevelyan and me in the one days time between his return here and talks with Hammarskjold. Department may wish to send some instructions for such a meeting.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1256. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 7:24 a.m., July 13. Repeated priority to London.↩
- See Document 440.↩