415. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy (Arad) and James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, Washington, June 29, 19561
SUBJECT
- Immediate Developments in the Palestine Question
Arad and I had one of our “regular” luncheons today at his request. I commenced our conversation by asking him if he had any information or ideas as to what would be Mr. Sharett’s future now that he was no longer Foreign Minister. Arad replied that from here it was difficult to see what Sharett’s future might be, but we might all know a little more about it and his Government’s plans after this weekend. When I asked him what was planned for the weekend he merely laughed and said that he assumed that the Embassy would have some later news on Mr. Sharett’s status.
I said that I was sorry to see Mr. Sharett leave his post. Despite all the difficulties and differences of opinion which might have occurred between the United States and Israel, Mr. Sharett had represented a degree of caution and moderation which was essential if there was ever to be any peace and stability in the Near East. In saying this I did not mean this to be any reflection on Mrs. Myerson. I certainly trusted that things would continue in their present relative state of lack of tension. I felt that in Israel’s and our [Page 761] interest it was of real importance at this stage of the game that nothing be done to upset a perhaps uneasy but nonetheless calm which prevailed in the area. From Israel’s point of view there was everything to gain and nothing to lose by avoiding any untoward difficulties or incidents. Shepilov had now had his trip to the Near East and he had returned to Moscow leaving the Arabs apparently empty–handed. While it was, of course, impossible to know for sure what might have been the “under the table deals” which Shepilov might have made with Nasser, it seemed superficially clear that the Arabs had not gotten the support for their point of view from Shepilov which they had expected to get. From what I could gather this was a particularly bitter disappointment in Damascus and Beirut. In both capitals much more forthright commitments from Shepilov had obviously been expected, and now because they had not gotten what they wanted there might be a very definite period of disillusionment and reconsideration as far as Arab policy vis–à–vis the Soviet Union was concerned. I was sure that Arad appreciated that once an Arab discovers that someone he thought was a friend was really not as much of a friend as he thought the bitterness and reaction which set in was extreme. It was possible that the Shepilov visit might engender new doubts and suspicions in the Arab mind as to Soviet objectives in the area and this would be all for the good so far as Israel and the free world were concerned.
Arad agreed with my suggestion that the Arabs were probably quite disappointed with the Shepilov trip and asked me what my analysis was as to why Shepilov had not made all the dramatic promises and gestures which many of us pessimistically expected during the trip. I replied that, as he and I had previously discussed, I thought there was basis for believing that the Soviets actually were somewhat alarmed that the arms deal had almost overcommitted them to support the Arabs in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. This was not what they desired, certainly at this stage of the game. Accordingly, they had probably felt it necessary to chill the emotions and irrationalities of the Arabs, particularly the Syrians, otherwise they might find themselves being called upon to support military activities in the area which they could not sustain, at least not now.
Arad said that assuming my analysis were correct, and he was inclined to think that it probably was, the fact could not be dismissed that new deals might have been made between the Soviets and Egypt. More arms might be coming into the area and the military situation would thereby become even more unbalanced. I said that it was, of course, always a possibility, as I had already mentioned, that deals might have been concluded or the Soviets might have deals planned for Nasser’s visit to the Soviet Union. For [Page 762] what it was worth, however, it was my guess that the Soviets would not now pump further munitions into the Arab countries and therefore the military imbalance would not necessarily be increased. Rather the only developments in the immediate future might be some further assimilation of the war matériel by the Egyptian armed forces which they had received from the Soviets.
Arad then asked me what the latest news was on the Aswan Dam and particularly what had been the results of Mr. Black’s visit to Cairo. I said that personally I was not familiar with the details beyond gathering that what Mr. Black had said to the press was a full enough description of the present situation, namely, that the status of the various offers so far as the Aswan Dam was concerned had not really changed materially since last February.2 This seemed to me to be another possible indication of the fact that the Shepilov visit had not been up to what the Arabs had expected. This again tended to underscore my conviction that in the possible period of quiet reflection that ought to follow the Shepilov visit the Israelis should not do anything which would tend to force a public realignment between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union. Arad merely replied vaguely that we would all have to await developments in this regard although he saw my point.
He then asked if it were true that Secretary General Hammarskjold was becoming increasingly concerned over the Arab–Israeli situation. (Having asked the question, he then said that Hammarskjold had so indicated recently to Mr. Kidron in New York.) I said that it was my guess that Hammarskjold was uneasy over possible developments in the area and I thought that that was an uneasiness which was shared by many. Arad wanted to know if it were developments within the Arab states or if Israel had something to do with it. I said that it was developments both in the Arab states and Israel. Having said this, I wanted to stress particularly what might be the basis for increasing uneasiness so far as Israel was concerned. I repeated that I was not in any way reflecting on Mrs. Myerson, but rightly or wrongly many people throughout the world were bound to be somewhat concerned by Mr. Sharett’s dismissal because we all knew him to epitomize the counsels of caution and moderation in his government. It might very well be that from Israel’s point of view there would be distinct advantage in the days ahead where its leadership would be far less predictable than had been the case with Mr. Sharett. I didn’t question Ben Gurion’s sincere desire for peace in the area. How he arrived at it, however, was something which had a direct bearing on the ways and means of the United States and other peace–loving countries assisting in achieving that peace. [Page 763] We clearly could not be at the mercy of forces which we could not predict. It was bad enough to estimate what the Arabs were going to do, and our problem was simply compounded by the possibility of not knowing what Mr. Ben Gurion was going to do.
Arad interjected very fervently that I should understand that Ben Gurion was a man of peace and that it was only through his personal power and leadership that Israel had not reacted completely and violently to the Fedayeen attacks of last summer and this April. I replied that I already said that I believed Ben Gurion was a man of peace. I was sure he had been a deciding influence for peace so far as Israel’s reaction to the Fedayeen raids was concerned. I also thought that it was perfectly clear that he had been responsible for the Gaza raid. Arad retorted immediately that this couldn’t be, since he wasn’t in the government at the time. When I reminded him that Ben Gurion had succeeded to the Ministry of Defense only a week before the Gaza raid and must have known that it was going to be perpetrated if he did not direct it, Arad subsided and protested again that Ben Gurion was the major force for peace in Israel. I repeated a third time that I believed he really was a man of peace, but how he got peace was something which was going to require international cooperation and not unpredictable unilateral actions. What he, Arad, had told me more than ever convinced me of the fact that from now on the foreign policy of Israel would be far more identifiable with the personality and decisions of Ben Gurion. It was for this reason that I again stressed my hope that Israel would see the enormous advantage of a period of calm which would provide reflection by the Arabs on their relations with the Soviet Union and perhaps arising therefrom a greater degree of Arab rationality which might lead to significant developments in bringing peace in the area.
Arad again said that he saw my point, but concluded bitterly that the United States had done nothing in the past to make a policy of moderation “pay off” in Israel.