413. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
2589. Reference Department cirtel 904.2 Specific information lacking reference subjects discussed with Shepilov. Seems probable discussions were primarily economic and we believe they centered [Page 757] on reiteration Russian preparedness finance or participate in financing High Dam. …. In addition appears probable Russians may have made firm offers to purchase (perhaps to some extent with sterling) bulk of Egypt’s exportable surplus cotton and to have undertaken construct factories in Egypt. We have also heard Russian project construct atomic reactor progressing favorably but details as yet unclear… .
In political field no specific information available other than that obtained via Iraqi Ambassador (Embtel 25583) to effect Soviets had expressed intent go along with U.N. efforts towards Palestine settlement (with GOE concurring only in so far as reduction border tension involved) and had generally expressed support Arab position on Algeria without specific endorsement Arab tactics. We have heard no reports reference discussion “anti–colonialism” or Baghdad Pact (which we assume took place) nor has there been any mention discussion friendship treaty or other political agreements.
Reaction in Egypt to Shepilov visit appears mixed. General Egyptian assumption appears to be that irrespective vagueness communiqué, general agreement was reached in foreign policy and cultural fields and Soviets have left with GOE specific proposals in economic field. Reference latter Egyptians now appear expect increasingly closer association with Soviet bloc. While there is some skepticism in banking and commercial circles and among other sophisticated elements (including some army officers) regarding Soviet motives and compatibility present trend with Egypt’s interests, these groups currently politically ineffective and their doubts are, we believe, generally offset by widespread belief in left wing and nationalist circles that it is wishful thinking to expect West finance Dam on terms compatible Egyptian sovereignty, that dangers of dealing with Soviets in present era of “détente” have been exaggerated, and that in any case Egypt must move forward politically and economically irrespective risks.
Results of Shepilov visit will not, we think, be immediately apparent. Nasser has gone out of his way to play down visit by having communiqué drafted as vaguely as possible and by subordinating its treatment in press to celebration evacuation, referendum and proclamation new regime. Visit has, however, most probably provided GOE with concrete proposals which Nasser can fall back on if he fails obtain from West equally firm (although not necessarily so extensive) commitments as to extent to which West willing go meet Egypt’s economic requirements. Since it is doubtful that Nasser believes West is now prepared to follow through on High Dam project, we expect that even during this “period of grace” news [Page 758] media may begin prepare Egyptian and Arab world for announcement acceptance Soviet economic offers on excuse Western indifference, stalling or insistence upon “conditions” incompatible Egyptian independence and sovereignty. Extent to which Western “culpability” and “perfidy” will be stressed in such output probably depends on general atmosphere then prevailing in area, Western reaction if Soviet offer is accepted and domestic need quench any opposition such acceptance. We inclined believe that in absence resumption negotiations by West, Soviet High Dam offer will probably be accepted prior opening of parliament and possibly prior Nasser’s return from Moscow.
In political field, Nasser apparently still hopes (and we have no evidence that Shepilov has sought dissuade him) that Egypt can follow genuinely independent foreign policy maintaining good relations with West as well as East providing West is prepared accept his definition as to what is in interests Egypt and Arabs. Seems probable this concept will be reaffirmed in course his forthcoming meetings with Nehru and Tito in Yugoslavia. In long run however probable Western refusal collaborate with Egypt in economic and political fields substantially on latter’s terms combined with increasing pressures from domestic leftist and nationalist elements in favor more active “liberation” policy suggests chances success this policy are at best problematical.
Instead, we can probably expect that increasing Egyptian economic dependence on Soviets and continuation general Soviet endorsement Egyptian foreign policy will be reflected externally by continuing Government of Egypt emphasis on dangers to Egypt, Arabs and Africans from “imperialists” and internally by trend away from Western influenced economic and political concepts in direction socialism. Speed at which this trend will develop will depend, among other things, on role of army which although nationalist has strong middle class conservative economic and social sentiments, on reaction other influential elements opposed to more intensive cooperation with Soviet bloc and on extent to which labor, intellectuals and other leftist–nationalist elements possibly supported by youth and peasants are able exert contrary pressures. We consider it likely that withdrawal Western support from Egypt would shortly be followed by further development strong indigenous nationalist movement whose internal policies would be authoritarian and whose foreign policies would be increasingly anti–Western.
Effect such development in area as whole cannot be predicted from here with certainty but we can surely expect that Soviet–Egyptian partnership will be carefully followed by peoples Near East [Page 759] and Africa for proof whether, as Soviets claim, Arabs with help their new–found friends can achieve status as power to be reckoned with.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6180/6–2856. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:40 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Benghazi, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Alexandria, Port Said, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Belgrade, Athens, Rome, Tehran, Karachi, and New Delhi.↩
- Circular telegram 904, June 23, requested the Embassies in Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, and Tel Aviv to furnish an analysis of the Shepilov visits. (Ibid., 033.6180/6–2356)↩
- Document 409.↩