391. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
2428. Hussein—confronted with a Nasser who apparently has no regrets for any of his actions or stands he has taken because he believes them best for Egypt, and myself—under injunction from Department to keep on saying same thing we have said many times [Page 721] but not move into specific constructive suggestions—have in past week been able to accomplish very little. He has held off seeing Nasser, hoping to work out with me positive program but feels he should wait no longer and has asked for another appointment.
Hussein and I agree almost entirely as to roots of sharp clash and lack of mutual confidence. Some of these, from a practical point of view may well be beyond correction. Hussein not entirely pessimistic, however, as he still hoping after next talk to find a way to start thing back on better track. Have told him probably most fundamental question he should seek answer to as far Department concerned is whether or not Nasser really wants to have friendship of America.
On our side have feeling we may not be totally realistic in setting our own goals. We have lost heavily here and must recognize rather than fight this fact if we are to retain any position at all. We have assumed that through our military and economic assistance programs around world we would obtain political benefits and we must recognize that same applies to others.
As illustrative example, would assume that our pre–Cyprus influence in Greece stemmed to great extent from fact we provided military equipment when they felt they really needed it, and that we assisted greatly their economic development. In eyes of leaders in Egypt, they needed military equipment in interests security of country as much as Greece did. In Egyptian viewpoint West would not approve or effectively implement a policy to help Egypt become safely stronger than Israel but Russia would, and hence gained genuine respect if not gratitude of GOE. Trade that has been established with Eastern Bloc is more important to Egypt than any economic aid we are likely to give. Under these conditions to expect Nasser be decidedly pro–Western not very realistic. On matters of ideology we can expect continued leanings toward West of bulk of educated people. On practical politics we can have neutralism but to expect more now probably just won’t work.
At end of our session yesterday Hussein made impassioned plea as regards Israel. He stated that following talks with all walks of life here, including well–educated normally pro–United States elements quite apart from government, he concluded that almost all of our problems went back to this sore point. United States and Egypt basically had no real problems except for this one. Even when we accused of assisting imperialism and colonialism, the thought in peoples’ minds was not North Africa or some far–away place but they were really burning inside about Israel.
Hussein said our present policy was getting us nothing but enmity of both sides and he felt we would have to make up our mind pretty soon or lose completely. We could no longer in fact be [Page 722] friends of both Arab States and Israel and he did not know which choice we would make but said a decided choice was needed soon. He did not believe we should side with Arabs on policies which would lead to destruction of Israel nor did he think that necessary. What he strongly argued for was that we publicly support a settlement using the 1947 partition boundaries as a basis for negotiating. He carried argument that this would require force by admitting obviously we could do no such thing, but whether settlement achieve this basis or not was not so important. What we needed was a public stand which would be interpreted as just in Arab world and this could gain us very much. He thought taking position that this our view was consistent with our policy of supporting United Nations and that we should withhold assistance from either side that would not accept. His final remark was that if we did not take opportunity do this very soon he felt surely Russians would and then we would be in impossible position.
While I would not go so far as to withhold assistance and while I realize difficulties, must say that from purely foreign policy point of view believe Hussein probably right. Nor am I certain adopting such a course would be worst thing for Israel, as fact that time is running on side of Arabs cannot as practical matter now be reversed, and in not too distant future Arab asking price may be shockingly greater. However I do not believe Israeli question alone need be insurmountable obstacle to better relations if Nasser and United States prepared give high priority for reversing current disintegration.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/6–756. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:13 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.↩