Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

379. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, May 30, 1956—9 p.m.

2370. Trevelyan not enthused about approach in Deptel 2815² but had no objection. Called upon Kaissuny this morning comply with these instructions.

Kaissuny confused by approach but believe was able end conversation at point where it best served purpose Department. His first remark was that Egypt could proceed with first phase as far as language of agreement with Bank and tentative language United States and United Kingdom aides-mémoire³ was concerned before agreement with Sudan. Told him I would have to review language but we were proceeding on assumption it was stated intention of Egypt to secure agreement with Sudan first. He said this correct, and they certainly were endeavoring to follow such a course.

In order insure there be no misunderstanding, I read to Kaissuny language second, third and fourth paragraphs above reference telegram, putting stress on fourth paragraph stating wished inform Washington as accurately as possible of status of Sudan talks. Was able to keep discussion fairly well concentrated on this except Kaissuny remarked once that he could see only one of two reasons for this approach. Either we wished to find out whether there possibility 56 funds might still be needed or whether we wondering what to include in 57 appropriations. Told him I thought neither the case.

As regards talks with Sudan, he said there had been most serious exchange of views and Sudan was much more reasonable now on waters agreement. The currency talks were underway and they were having great difficulty on the subject of compensation regarding Wadia Haifa. He made same statement as Trevelyan that he believed waters agreement itself would not cause much trouble. Could not, however, get him to estimate probable date when talks might be successfully concluded.

In general manner, he said construction of High Dam was still cornerstone of Egypt’s development policy. This reported as there have been rumors that Egypt might be losing interest in High Dam for various reasons.

Discussion accomplished very little except to let us say we have talked recently on subject High Dam with GOE.⁴

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–3056. Secret. Received at 11:24 p.m. Repeated to London and Khartoum.
2. Document 365.
3. See telegram 1282, vol. XIV, p. 868.
4. Telegram 2394 from Cairo, June 2, reported further on this conversation: “Entire tone of conversation was Kaissuny’s concern that we could not go ahead and finish negotiations. He asked at one point if I could not get instructions to allow negotiations be resumed on specific language of aide-mémoire.” (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–256)