Office of the Historian

367. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1

London, May 25, 1956—7 p.m.

5482. Reference Deptel 7084,2 Embassy has not recently discussed Aswan Dam project at highest level in HMG but discussion today at Foreign Office working level basis Deptel 71223 confirmed Embassy’s impression British disposed to stall on project as long as possible. British are aware of probable Congressional attitude mentioned first paragraph Deptel 7084.

Possibility of establishing international Nile Valley authority was debated in House of Commons May 18 when Parliamentary Under-Secretary Dodds-Parker, speaking for Government, expressed belief such body may well come into being at some future time if circumstances should permit but he also said present High Aswan Dam project was not inconsistent with such international authority. (See Emb despatch 2893, May 24.4) Taking these statements as cue and without of course referring in any way to proposal outlined in Department reftel, Embassy officer in conversation at Foreign Office yesterday inquired as to current thinking of HMG regarding international authority. Foreign Office official replied HMG has given practically no thought to Nile Valley authority and therefore does not know its full implications. He expressed belief it would take long time for riparian states to agree regarding a concept of this nature which he pointed out had only been advanced in the most tentative form. He stated HMG would oppose international Nile Valley authority at present time.

Although foregoing discussion took place in a different context from that of proposal Department has in mind in Deptel 7084 it appears to Embassy on basis conversation summarized above that initial British reaction to proposal would probably be unfavorable at this time.

While Embassy of course appreciates reasons which cause Department to consider proposals of this sort, we question whether this particular proposal (1) would not be transparent to Egyptians as stalling tactic (interest of certain of riparian states mentioned Department reftel, i.e., Belgian Congo and British East African territories would appear to be distinctly marginal) and (2) might not also [Page 676] result in loss for U.S. of future maneuverability in a changing situation.

Aldrich
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2556. Top Secret. Received at 9:12 p.m. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Cairo, and Khartoum.↩
  2. Printed as telegram 226, Document 362.↩
  3. Printed as telegram 2815, Document 365.↩
  4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2456)↩