363. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1

2318. Saw Hussein briefly right after his initial meeting with Nasser. Hussein had following points of interest on this first encounter.

(1)
He personally felt completely reassured that Nasser had no intention of attacking Israel.
(2)
Nasser’s feeling on question of arms for Israel was intense. He obviously operating under some type of intelligence unknown to us which indicates that definite decision was made to try to keep Israel as strong as Arab States. He feels blame must be shared but mentioned Eden particularly. He apparently wonders whether things have reached point in Britain where British would even spur Israeli aggressions against Egypt. He felt that real motivation behind rumored arms blockade again lay with Eden and that Eden envisaged type of blockade which Israelis could circumvent as in past hostilities. I told Hussein to pass to Nasser that I absolutely convinced he operating under false information. Truth was almost entirely to [Page 670] contrary as Eden had been annoyed at Russian suggestion of arms embargo to Middle East which he saw as move on their part to wreck Baghdad Pact.
(3)
Secretary should not feel that motive behind recognition Red China was slap at US. Timing of this act had been related solely to establishing new source of arms because of Nasser’s feelings as above on question arms for Israel. Hussein said Nasser asked that I be told this officially and that he regretted apparent misinterpretation in United States.
Byroade
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2356. Secret; Priority. Received at 11:45 p.m.. May 25. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris.