333. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
2474. Since my return2 there have been no particular indications in Moscow of any further development Soviet attitude on Israeli/ Arab question and Near East matters in general. We have not seen any full account of British-Soviet discussions on this point but judging from press and info telegrams from London, Soviets refused to make any commitment concerning future arms deliveries.
Israeli Ambassador, whom I have found very knowledgeable in regard to Soviets (he was born in Russia), is very definitely of the impression that around the middle of April, probably because of stepped up incidents in early April, Soviets finally came to realization that there was a genuine danger of outbreak of open warfare between Israel and Egypt, whereas before, as Department is aware, Soviets had generally taken line that seriousness of situation was being deliberately exaggerated by Western powers for their own purposes. Avidar considers this belated recognition of real nature situation in Near East to be the chief cause of Soviet April 17 statement. He said contrast between his interview with Molotov in early February (Embtel 17793) and a talk he had with Semenov in [Page 613] Foreign Office following issuance April 17 statement had confirmed his impression.
Ambassador said he had never believed that Soviets were interested in outbreak of hostilities in Near East which in itself would confront them with choices they would prefer not to make, either real risk of involvement or loss of such positions as they have recently diplomatically established in area.
On arms delivery, based on conversation he had with Soviet Ambassador in Tel Aviv4 during his leave there, Avidar believes that Soviets might be interested in general embargo of arms to area which would however specifically include Turkey as country geographically belonging to area, but would not be prepared merely to cease deliveries to Egypt or accept any commitments to refrain from deliveries to other Arab countries. He considers, with which I fully agree, that chief Soviet purpose in Near East is to forestall future or disrupt existing Western military arrangements in that region. He envisages possibility that general embargo on shipment of arms to area, including Turkey, might be in Soviet eyes one method of furthering this aim.
Foregoing is of course Ambassador Avidar’s personal views but, which as Embassy reports have indicated, I am in general agreement. In view of recent developments in Near East, and particularly reported Egyptian-Israeli truce observance commitment resulting from Hammarskjold’s visit,5 it is possible for moment that Soviets will not take any further initiative.
It would be helpful to Embassy if we could have any information received from British concerning Soviet attitude during London talks.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–456. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:08 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.↩
- Ambassador Bohlen was in Washington April 8–22 for consultation; he returned to Moscow on April 24.↩
- Telegram 1779, February 8, reported on Avidar’s conversation with Molotov on February 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.84A/2–856)↩
- Alexander N. Abramov.↩
- See Document 317.↩
- The Embassy in London agreed with Ambassador Avidar’s analysis as reported by Bohlen. (Telegram 5122 from London, May 7; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–756)↩