300. Editorial Note
On April 21, Chargé Walworth Barbour in London informed Secretary Dulles that on the morning of April 20, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai A. Bulganin and Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, along with other Soviet officials, met with British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, and their advisers at 10 Downing Street. Among the topics discussed was the need to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Barbour reported:
“Eden made forceful presentation seriousness situation importance Israeli-Arab settlement. He took line that it is evident from Sov ME statement and other indications that Sovs look to the UN to handle ME and specifically Arab-Israeli problem. He noted that tripartite declaration had been designed to cover a situation in which the UN should be unable or prevented from taking effective action. The Brit concurred that UN should be the forum for the settlement of this problem and in the Brit view to the extent that UN is effective in the matter the tripartite declaration will recede into the background. He accordingly pressed Sovs to agree to waive veto in Security Council in naming aggressor in case hostilities. Khrushchev reacted violently citing record Sovs vetoes Security Council which he maintained were on matters vital interest to Sovs and completely rejected idea advance commitment not to exercise right granted in UN Charter. Eden pointed out that agreement to waive a right does not prejudice existence of that right but Sovs adamant. However, Kirkpatrick feels that although no progress made on veto it may be useful to have on record for future clear-cut Sov refusal this time.
“Discussion continued on general desirability UN action Arab-Israeli dispute and was finally agreed that representatives both sides would attempt to come up with draft joint statement to be issued embodying measure joint views. As result Kirkpatrick for the UK and Gromyko for the USSR met this morning and have prepared a [Page 568] statement for submission to principals which Kirkpatrick says contains six points substantially as follows:
“1. Support will be given to UN efforts to maintain peace in the Middle East and to the decisions of the Security Council to that end.
“2. The parties involved in the Arab-Israeli problem will be called on not to increase tension along the demarcation lines.
“3. The UN should take immediate steps to achieve a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem.
“4. The UK and the USSR will support any endeavor to achieve a solution on a basis mutually acceptable to both sides.
“5. The UK and the USSR recognize the importance of the refugee problem and will support any UN action to relieve the hardships of the refugees.
“6. The UK and the USSR hope that other governments will rally to the support of UN efforts to reach a solution. Statement also contains language endorsing independence of ME states in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and recognizing of importance that UN action be such as to take account of the interests of all countries concerned.
“Kirkpatrick noted that point 4 is an effort to incorporate your helpful suggestion (Deptel 6283) with which the Brit concur. Generally Kirkpatrick is pleased with Gromyko’s acceptance of a statement as outlined, since he believes that its general impact will tend to put Sovs in the doghouse with the Arabs. Incidentally, he professed surprise that Sovs appear either ignorant or unconcerned at effect such declaration on Arabs. Kirkpatrick said Gromyko had endeavored insert statement that UK and USSR would not intervene in Middle East affairs but that they had declined to do so on grounds of Brit specific obligations to Jordan and also his feeling that should hostilities break out Egyptians although now unfriendly would in all probability seek Brit help.” (Telegram 4803 from London, April 21; Department of State, Central Files, 033.6141/4–2156)