Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, April 12, 1956—6 p.m.

3802. On April 11 French Ambassador informed Secretary contents urgent telegraphic communication from Pineau expressing concern at rapid deterioration Near East situation and view Tripartite Powers could not remain “impassive” when hostilities might break out at any time.² Since it seemed possible Hammarskjold peace mission had been overtaken by events, Pineau thought that he, Secretary and Lloyd should meet without delay to discuss evolution of events. Message expressed no preference as to place of meeting, but stated situation such as to render it inadvisable await scheduled Tripartite meeting Paris May 6.

French Ambassador informed April 12 that Pineau proposal had been given careful consideration by Secretary who, on balance, did not think it would be wise call Ministerial meeting this juncture.³ Tripartite meeting could be interpreted as competitive with mission Hammarskjold who at present in area talking with both sides. Secretary believed in first instance we should support Hammarskjold mission, and until we knew results it would not be productive for three governments pursue separate course. However, in view tense situation it obviously important for us keep in close touch and senior officers Department available at any time for this purpose. Ambassador undertook convey this reaction Pineau.

British Embassy Washington informed by Foreign Office London similar approach by French there.⁴ Understood Lloyd shares Secretary’s view Ministerial meeting this juncture inadvisable. He suggested to US possible alternative holding Ambassadorial Committee meeting Washington to discuss situation. In conveying British Embassy substance US position as given French Ambassador,⁵ Department expressed reservation re Ambassadorial Committee meeting since publicity which probably inevitable would create many of the problems involved in Ministerial meeting. Department thought it important, however, three governments keep in close touch through normal channels.

FYI only: There are some indications UK desires create public impression Tripartite plans have been refined to point where there clear understanding what powers will do both within and outside UN in case hostilities should break out. Implication would be that military action involved. Because of number factors including Congressional reaction US must carefully avoid any such implication. End FYI.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–1256. Secret. Drafted and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London.
2. The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2)
3. The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 780.00/ 4–1256)
4. The memorandum of conversation between Wilkins and Willie Morris of the British Embassy is not printed. (Ibid., 396.1/4–1156)
5. The memorandum of conversation between Rountree and John E. Coulson of the British Embassy is not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2)