Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

230. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, March 30, 1956, 2:38–3:10 p.m.¹

Washington, March 30, 1956, 2:38–3:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Senator George
• Mr. MacArthur

I thanked Senator George for coming to see me, and explained that I wished to bring him up-to-date on the Middle East situation and to give him our latest thinking with respect to it.

On the one hand, our policy was based on the existence of the State of Israel, to which we were committed, and on the other hand on the fact that we wished to retain the good will and friendship of the Arab States, not only because of their important strategic position but principally because of the oil resources which they controlled. If the Soviets could get control of the Arab States, they could cut off the oil supplies to Western Europe. Control of the Arab States by the Communists would enable the Soviet Union to threaten Western Europe with a cessation of oil and this, as blackmail, would be just about as effective as if they threatened them with atomic destruction. If faced with the threat of oil stoppages, it was doubtful that the Western European countries would be able to resist coming to terms with the Soviets. Another aspect of the situation was that at present the pipelines running through the Arab States were mined, and could be destroyed quickly. If, through Communist influence, the pipelines were destroyed and the Suez Canal were blocked, Western Europe would be faced with a desperate situation, since there was not sufficient tankerage to carry the oil, if it were still available at the source, around the Cape of Good Hope to Western Europe, and there was not sufficient oil in the Western Hemisphere to take care of the US and Western Europe. It would mean that the Western European industrial complex would grind to a halt and all the progress we had made there through Marshall Plan and NATO would go down the drain.

Senator George nodded his assent, and said that Communist control of the Arab oil resources would be a disastrous blow.

I then said we had been using our influence with Colonel Nasser to try to get him to take constructive steps which would reduce tension with Israel, and also to forego acquiring further arms from the Soviet bloc. Nasser, however, had not thus far responded constructively. He seemed to be rather full of himself and convinced that he could have the best of both worlds by playing with the Soviets on the one hand and trying to extract more aid from us on the other.

In the light of this situation, and after very careful study, a program of broad scope had been developed by the Executive Branch of the Government.² This program³ had received the President’s approval Wednesday afternoon,⁴ and I wished to bring Senator George fully into the picture. In essence, the program involved a series of coordinated⁵ steps which would result on the one hand in⁶ Egypt not getting satisfaction on some of its requests for aid. For example, we intended to continue to delay conclusion of the current negotiations on the High Aswan Dam. Also, we would continue to deny export licenses covering arms shipments to Egypt. We would also delay action on pending Egyptian requests for certain agricultural commodities under PL 480. Likewise, we would delay action on the Egyptian requests for CARE shipments. At the same time, we planned to take certain steps to strengthen the Arab countries which were cooperating, and in this connection, while we did not plan to join the Baghdad Pact, we would send high level observers to attend meetings of the Baghdad Pact. I explained that I doubted the Senate would approve our joining the Baghdad Pact unless we took some steps to conclude a security agreement with Israel. If we did this at this juncture we would alienate the Arabs.

Senator George said he concurred that the Senate would not view favorable adherence to the Baghdad Pact at this juncture, and in this connection said it was not only a question of Israel, but that Indian opposition to our joining was another factor which would be weighed.

I also mentioned that we would try to extend our influence with the new Sudan Government through various steps so that we would be able to exercise greater influence with the Sudan Government respecting the head waters of the Nile.

With respect to arms shipments to Israel, I explained that we would continue to deny export licenses for major military items but that we would interpose no objection if certain Western countries such as France, Italy, and Canada wished to export some military equipment to Israel. From a conversation I had had with Ambassador Eban,⁷ I felt that the Israelis were not now as insistent as they had been a month ago that we supply major military items to Israel, since they felt that they might be able to obtain such military equipment from other states (from which they had traditionally purchased such equipment), if the US did not interpose objection. I added that the US had never supplied Israel with major items of military equipment, and that Israel had obtained most of its equipment from European sources.

I then said to Senator George that I had a suggestion which I would put forward for his consideration. This was that I felt it would be extremely helpful if, on an informal basis, Senator Mansfield could take an active interest in the Middle East situation and we could read him very fully into the picture and could consult with him informally so that we could have the benefit of his views and he would know what we were doing. I said Senator Mansfield came to mind since he had made a great contribution in his studies and reports on the Indochina situation. Furthermore, of the members of the Committee, he seemed the least likely to inject a partisan note into this vital issue. We could use Senator Mansfield as a sort of informal liaison link with the Committee.

Senator George said he fully concurred with the high estimate we had of Senator Mansfield. He thought an arrangement such as I had suggested seemed feasible. I said it might raise a problem with respect to Senator Green, who was Chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee. Senator George agreed that there might be a little problem of prestige, but said that Senator Green would not be able, because of his advanced years, to give the time and thought to the Middle East situation that Senator Mansfield could. After some further discussion, and after it was ascertained that Senator Mansfield would be in town next week, Senator George undertook to telephone, before his departure from Washington this evening, to Senator Mansfield, explaining the situation and suggesting that he arrange to meet with me next week.

There was some further general discussion of the situation in the Middle East, including a brief reference to Prime Minister Eden. I mentioned that Foreign Minister Pearson was concerned about Sir Anthony Eden and felt that he was exhibiting some of the traits his father had shown. Senator George opined that Sir Anthony was not well, and that in view of his heavy responsibilities, the state of his health, and the fundamental fact that Britain had lost its empire, Sir Anthony’s actions were understandable because of the pressures to which he was subjected.

In conclusion, I said that if the arrangement went through whereby we could have close informal contact with Senator Mansfield and could use him as a sort of liaison with us, this would be very helpful. It would not, of course, interfere with the regular consultations that we would have with the Foreign Relations Committee, but with Senator Mansfield we could go into matters on a much more intimate basis.⁸ Also, I said we of course attached great importance to keeping Senator George fully informed of all aspects of this and other related foreign policy problems.

Senator George expressed appreciation for the information which I had given him. He said he had been hoping the situation in the Middle East might calm down, but this had not resulted. We should therefore do everything we could to reduce tensions in the area and to prevent a Communist take-over.

While Senator George did not specifically endorse the details of the program I had outlined to him, he raised no objection to any of the points, and indicated general understanding and assent.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations, 1951–1957. Top Secret. According to a covering memorandum by MacArthur, MacArthur drafted this memorandum of conversation in the first person for Dulles, and Macomber initialed Dulles’ approval on the covering memorandum. The time and place of the meeting are from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. See Documents 222 and 223.
3. At this point, in unidentified handwriting, the following phrase was inserted into this sentence: “which for obvious reasons must be held in strictest secrecy”.
4. March 28. See Documents 224 and 225.
5. At this point, in unidentified handwriting, the following words were inserted into this sentence: “but unobtrusive”.
6. At this point, in unidentified handwriting, the sentence was changed to conclude as follows: “withholding approval of any significant aid to Egypt”.
7. See Document 221.
8. Dulles met with Senator Mansfield on March 31 at Dulles’ residence. According to Dulles’ memorandum of the conversation, Dulles “said that while of course we would expect him to maintain his complete independence, we would want to feel free to give him information on a confidential basis”. Mansfield replied, “he would be glad to specialize in the situation as he had with Indochina.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation)