Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

228. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Minister of the Israeli Embassy (Shiloah) and the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell), Department of State, Washington, March 29, 1956¹

Washington, March 29, 1956

SUBJECT

• Follow-up to Secretary’s Meeting with Ambassador Eban, March 28, 1956

Mr. Shiloah asked to see me this morning. He referred to the meeting which he and Ambassador Eban had had with the Secretary yesterday afternoon.² He said that, although the Secretary had not been explicit, he and Eban had interpreted one or two of the Secretary’s statements as meaning that, while the United States thought it should not provide arms to Israel at the present time, it felt that Israel should receive some of the arms at least in the November 16th list³ from the European countries which had customarily been Israel’s source of supply for military equipment. Shiloah said that he and Eban felt it was further implicit in the Secretary’s remarks that the U.S. would make appropriate suggestions to the European countries so that the virtual embargo which they have imposed up to the present time would no longer be applied. Shiloah said that if their interpretation of the Secretary’s remarks was correct, they would like to know how we visualized implementing them. Should the Israel Government report to the other countries the conversation which Eban had with the Secretary yesterday? Should the Israel Government sit down with the State Department and decide upon the particular equipment which Israel should receive from each of the other countries and the U.S. then pass the word along to those countries? Or how? I told Shiloah those were questions which would have to receive consideration in the Department before it would be possible to give answers.

I also said I felt the Israel Government should simultaneously be giving most careful consideration to the questions raised in the Secretary’s talk with Eban just before the Secretary left on his Far East trip.⁴ I said the way in which the problems raised by Mr. Shiloah were answered would have to depend in part upon the atmosphere in which the Israel Government intended to work with this Government. I said if we were to achieve our objectives of preventing Soviet penetration in the area and deal effectively with Nasser’s growing tendency to serve Soviet objectives, and if we were to be able to indicate safely and confidentially to other governments that we thought certain shipments of arms to Israel might be in the interest of Western objectives and area security, it would be essential that we not have to continue to operate in an atmosphere of political attack from the Israel Government (such as Ben Gurion’s recent statement that if war came in the Middle East, it would be the result of U.S. and Soviet policies in the area⁵) and from its friends in this country. At the time Ben Gurion was making his intemperate statements he knew and we knew about the Anderson mission but, of course, we would not make any public reference to it in answer to his attacks. Similarly, in the period ahead we would be attempting to carry out other policies which could not be made fully public. We would be seriously handicapped if we were subjected to ill-informed attacks from well-intentioned people who took their lead from the Israel Government. Indeed, whether we could wisely pursue a given line of policy might depend upon whether the Israel Government persisted in trying to effectuate its ideas of strategy and tactics at any given moment, over those which we might feel to be most indicated, by whipping up pressures from groups who, in the nature of the case, could not know all the facts. We could hardly carry out the kind of secret cooperation which Mr. Shiloah had just suggested with one hand while trying to fend off intemperate blows with the other. I said that while we were considering the questions which he had raised, I thought it might be wise if he and Ambassador Eban gave some thought to the problem which the Secretary had mentioned on March 2. If they found that they could give some assurance along this line, I was sure Israel’s and our common interests in Middle East security would be furthered. Mr. Shiloah said that obviously statements of the seriousness of those that the Secretary had made on March 2 would receive the most careful consideration by the Israel Government and he would see what assurances they might be able to give. As a hopeful indication, he said, Jacob Blaustein had called the Israel Embassy yesterday and said he was thinking of asking for an appointment with the Secretary and wondered whether the Israel Embassy had any suggestion to make. Mr. Shiloah said they had informed Blaustein they were not sure any useful purpose would be served by a meeting at this time.

(I had lunch yesterday, at his request, with Theodore Tannenwald, a New York lawyer, who is legal counsel for the Israel Embassy and currently employed in preparing the Israel Government’s presentation to the Export-Import Bank in connection with the application for a $75,000,000 loan,⁶ and who is also an intimate associate of Governor Harriman’s and writes many of his speeches that deal with U.S. policy toward the Middle East. While most of the discussion dealt with Israel’s present water development plans, I took occasion to make points similar to those above with respect to the harm that is done to vital Free World interests in the Middle East by attacks on present U.S. efforts to preserve Israel’s security while safeguarding the Free World’s vital interests by persons who cannot know all of the facts. I gave him mutatis mutandis an analysis of current Middle East problems and U.S. policies to deal with those problems similar to the one that I recently gave to Senators Case and Kennedy.⁷)

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., Feb. 16 to March 31, 1956. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell. A note attached to the source text indicates the Secretary saw the memorandum.
2. See Document 221.
3. See the memorandum of conversation, vol. XIV, p. 773.
4. See Document 151.
5. Reference is to Ben Gurion’s statement in the Knesset on March 6.
6. See Document 194.
7. No record of such a briefing has been found in Department of State files.