176. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State1
Dulte 14. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. There follows speculative exercise by Secretary of State which he and Allen think may be of interest to Department. It is transmitted without recommendation because we do not here have adequate time study the matter nor do we have facilities to appraise feasibility from standpoint of attitude of other countries
Obviously this line of action would be a clear-cut challenge Obviously this line of action would be a clear-cut challenge to Soviet-Egyptian ambitions ….
- “1. U.S. will adhere to Baghdad Pact with modification of, or reservation to, Article V so that any state may accede by unanimous approval of the UN members.
- 2. UK settles their controversies with Saudi Arabia.
- 3. US by Congressional resolution, preferably responsive to UN-sponsored request, authorizes President act in cooperation with other UN members to insure compliance with Israeli-Arab armistice agreements that the armistice lines shall not be changed except by mutual agreement, it being also understood that, as provided in these agreements, the armistice lines are not necessarily permanent boundary lines.
- 4. The US would then:
- Provide substantial military support to Saudi Arabia and Iraq;
- Accelerate its programs for Iran and Pakistan; and
- Sell defensive arms to Israel.”2
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 663. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 5:54 a.m. Hoover sent a copy to the President, whose copy bears a notation indicating that he saw it. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)↩
- Hoover responded to Dulles’ telegram as
“I believe suggestions Dulte 14 most helpful in connection urgent Staff Studies under way here. In light information from Cairo we proceeding on premise Nasser will not cooperate at present in seeking Arab-Israel settlement and is in effect working against West in concentrating on establishment ‘non-identified’, at best, bloc nations under Egyptian domination. We studying measures which might be taken against Egypt itself and against Egyptian influence in area.
“As you state success of program you outlined would depend on ability split Saudis from Egyptian orbit. We would need to induce at least tacit acceptance Baghdad Pact. Even this process of getting Saudis not to oppose Pact obviously most difficult in view … current successes, notably in Jordan, of ESS combine; possibility Saudi adherence in foreseeable future considered virtually nil. On our instructions, Gallman has discussed with Nuri necessity improve Iraqi-Saudi relations and we seeking Wads worth’s advice this connection on basis Nuri’s suggestions. To afford reasonable possibilities of success careful planning and coordination with other countries, especially UK, essential.” (Tedul 16 to Karachi, March 8; Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–856)↩