Office of the Historian

172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Karachi1

Washington, March 6, 1956—9:24 p.m.

Tedul 9. Eyes only for Secretary from Hoover. Re Palestine. Since your departure I have conferred with Roger Makins on Saturday concerning our idea of Security Council action on appointment of UN Agent General to keep peace in Palestine area.2 I informed him in general terms nature of our proposal. He indicated desire to be fully cooperative and hopes to have Foreign Office comment shortly. You may wish therefore to raise issue with Selwyn Lloyd.3 I [Page 320] spoke to President Monday generally outlining our thoughts on this matter.4

I have cabled Cabot Lodge telling him of our views as to serious nature of present situation.5

During next two or three days we propose discuss plans with UK and then Congressional leaders. From our present schedule we could not hope for start SC debate earlier than Monday March 19. Immediately following telegram sets forth present working draft of resolution.6 I will be in touch with you on later developments.7

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.51/3–656. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ludlow and approved by Hoover.↩
  2. No record of this conversation, which took place on March 3, has been found in Department of State files.↩
  3. Dulles spoke with Lloyd on March 5. They especially discussed U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact: “Secretary said if we tried to build up Baghdad Pact as rival organization to Nasser and Arab League at this time when there still seemed to be chance to get Nasser to do something on Johnston water plan and also with respect to moving Egyptian and Israeli forces back from Egyptian-Israeli frontier, we might increase our difficulties and precipitate action in an already dangerous situation.” The Secretary continued, “Certainly it was not possible to join this Pact without giving security agreement to Israel. If it were possible to do both, which just did not seem in cards at this time, Secretary felt we would only create greater difficulties for Iraq since Arab states would think Iraq, which they already regard as something of pariah, had agreed to US-Israel pact in return for US joining Baghdad Pact.” (Secto 14 from Karachi, March 7; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 670)↩
  4. See Document 161.↩
  5. See Document 166.↩
  6. Tedul 10 to Karachi, March 6, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–656)↩
  7. See Document 206.↩