Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

155. Message From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell) to Robert B. Anderson, at Cairo¹

No. 5

Washington , March 3, 1956

In light developments in area since last conversation with you in Department, suggest you make approach to Nasser on following points and ask him take initiative in securing consideration JVP at forthcoming Arab League Council meeting:

1. After preliminary discussions with Johnston last September, Nasser asked Johnston to let him pilot JVP through Arab League in his own way. Johnston agreed and placed major reliance on Nasser’s judgments as to tactics, even to point of requesting U.S. missions to cease pressing for plan. When Arab League Council met in October, Nasser informed Johnston that Arab acceptance not possible at that time, expressing view, however, that it could be carried to successful conclusion “in three or four months”. U.S. has counted and still counts on Egyptian initiative and strong support for plan.

2. Nasser has emphasized need to take steps prepare Arab world for peaceful settlement Arab-Israel question. Acceptance JVP would represent important step that direction. While JVP is non-political, adoption would center attention on constructive activity, assist settlement substantial numbers of restless and embittered refugees and pave way for more general accommodation.

3. Since last fall, Lebanon has completed arrangements with IBRD for Litani and Egypt has progressed far in negotiations on High Dam. HKJ must now be given opportunity for its development through Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. Egypt can strengthen its position in HKJ by helping secure that opportunity.

Nasser is likely emphasize three difficulties: (1) problem of handling Syrians, (2) Arab unwillingness act in response Israel pressure and (3) virtual impossibility securing acceptance JVP within framework forthcoming Council meeting. Suggest you respond to each as follows:

1. Insist that Nasser can bring Syrians around if he makes genuine tries. If Nasser continues express serious doubt as to his ability handle Syrians, you may wish to hint broadly that U.S. will regard his performance as significant indication of his capabilities for Arab leadership.

2. March 1 date highly publicized by Israelis for recommencing work at Banat Ya’qub has passed without incident. (FYI Israel Government has informed us it does not intend in any event plan commence construction prior to April 1.) Arab nations have maintained calm and firm position. This has demonstrated to world that Arabs refuse bow to pressure. Arab League is taking questions up in own good time, in accordance with decision last October, at regularly scheduled meeting of Council.

3. Final approval of JVP at Council meeting neither necessary nor practicable, since Arab League would not be party to agreement. Jordan, Lebanon and Syria as countries directly involved sought advice of League re JVP in conformity their obligations to coordinate policy with fellow Arab states. Logical next step is for Arab League to note findings of Arab Technical Committee, accept technical validity and economic soundness of plan, find it politically compatible with Arab policy and urge states directly concerned to approve it in accordance with their constitutional procedures. Remaining details could then be worked out with states concerned—if desired, by Johnston’s return to area.

FYI Present thinking is that Johnston’s return to area would not be warranted unless Arab League Council finds, at minimum, that JVP is not inconsistent with Arab policy. End FYI.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. Drafted by Troxel and approved by Rountree and Russell.