Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

105. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 20, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Alternative Courses of Action to Achieve Israel-Arab Settlement

Mr. Anderson, on his next trip to the area, will make every effort to work out a direct meeting between Nasser and Ben Gurion (or some other Israel representative). I am listing in a separate memorandum² some of the points which I suggest for Mr. Anderson’s use in his discussions with Nasser and Ben Gurion to bring about a meeting. The prospects of achieving a direct meeting, however, are less than fifty-fifty. I believe that before he leaves alternative course of action should be agreed upon in the event it is not possible to obtain a meeting and in the event it appears that the time within which a settlement can be worked out is sharply limited so that it would not be desirable for Mr. Anderson to take time to return here and then go back again to the area. This is likely to be the case. The tension in Israel will increase as long as they receive no arms. On the other hand, the granting of arms to Israel would seriously lessen the possibility of a settlement at this time. In Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world an attitude of cockiness and over-confidence is already showing itself and will probably soon reach a point where it will make it even more difficult than at present for us to obtain cooperation from them in a settlement. The Israel Government may commence work on Banat Yaacov any time after March 1, thereby touching off hostilities.

I suggest that a tentative decision be made now between one of the following alternatives as a “last shot” effort in the event a direct meeting cannot be arranged and it appears the time within which a settlement is possible is limited:

1. Mr. Anderson would say to both sides that we have failed in our effort to work out a settlement by the Trieste approach or by a direct meeting and that, as a final means of attempting to bring about a settlement, we would be willing, if desired by both sides, to present a suggested plan of settlement which we would hope both sides would earnestly consider. He should make it plain that the U.S. is not attempting to impose a settlement nor is it itself adopting a rigid position on the terms of what a settlement should be. It would be willing, however, to set forth what it believes, after listening to both sides, offers the best possibility of achieving a settlement that takes into account the vital interests of both sides.

2. An alternative method of putting forth a set of specific proposals would be to have some internationally prominent and objective person, such as Nehru or Hammarskjold, make specific proposals for a settlement. We could then put our support behind them and urge other governments to.

A proposed plan of settlement is attached. It provides for alternative positions on the Negev—one for cession and the other for internationalization of a portion of it.

There would, of course, be difficulties in either of the two proposals. In the case of (1) it would be difficult for us thereafter to serve as a mere intermediary. If the assumption that we only have a short while in which to work out a settlement is true, however, the loss of our ability to play this role is not too serious. It could, in any event, be minimized by Mr. Anderson putting forth the suggestions as his own rather than as a U.S. official position. Another objection is that if we suggest cession of a portion of the Negev, Israel might be resentful. In effect, however, such a suggestion would be going little further than you already have in your statements to Sharett. Finally, such a suggested solution might touch off a decision by the Israel Government to resort to preventive action. We are, however, likely in any event to be faced with such a possibility if no settlement is reached.

The advantages of pursuing one of the two courses of action are: (a) it would, to a greater extent than has been done up to the present time, give focus and concreteness to what is required in obtaining a settlement and the advantages that will flow from one; (b) if alternative No. 2 is taken, it will make it possible to marshall behind concrete proposals the very great U.S. and world public opinion that currently, in an amorphous way, supports the idea of a settlement; (c) there is substantial opinion that neither side will be able to bring itself on its own steam to make the necessary concessions for a settlement but that each side might decide to undertake to justify concessions to its nationals in the context of (1) or (2) above.

[Attachment]³

February 17, 1956.

A. THE NEGEV

Alternative I

The cession to Egypt or Jordan of that portion of the Negev lying between a line drawn from the southern tip of the El Auja demilitarized zone to a point south of Ein Husb (Hotseva), and a line across the southern Negev north of the Wadi Menayieh; … free access to the Arabs of the Beersheba road through Israel from Cairo to Amman; free access to Israel of the main road from Beersheba to Eilat.

This could be phrased in more general terms as the cession of the central Negev.

Alternative II

The creation of an autonomous, bi-national region under U.N. trusteeship comprising … the El Auja demilitarized zone and the entire Negev lying south of a line drawn from El Auja to the vicinity of Ein Husb; free transit rights on the major roads through the region to Israel and the Arab states; free use to both Israelis and Arabs of the ports of Gaza and Eilat; political status, including freedom of movement within the region, to present permanent inhabitants of the region; demilitarization of the entire region.

This could be phrased in general terms as the internationalization of the Negev.

B. OTHER TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Division of the remaining “demilitarized zones” and “no man’s lands” created by the armistice agreements; restoration to Arab border villages of a portion of the farm lands and groves which were cut off by the armistice demarcation lines; other alterations of the demarcation lines for such purposes as improvement of communications, access to water supplies, establishment of more rational boundaries, etc.

C. THE REFUGEES

The Arab refugees to be offered the choice between repatriation on the one hand and resettlement and compensation on the other, with not more 15,000 refugees to be repatriated per year for five years and 5,000 per year thereafter. Compensation and resettlement to be financed and administered (with assistance from the international community) in such a way as to maximize the appeal of this choice as compared with repatriation. Election of one of the two alternatives to be made within a period of two years after conclusion of a settlement. The refugees repatriated to assume all rights and obligations of Israel citizenship. Israel to renounce the claims which it had advanced against the Arab States for war damages and abandoned Jewish property. No compensation to be claimed on behalf of the Arab refugees for war damages on such items as movable personal property and lost income. Compensation payments to be made to the individual refugees through a quasi-judicial process in a manner to encourage investment in the area and prevent inflation.

D. JERUSALEM

2. Creation of an international organization for supervising the Holy places in Palestine and maintaining access to them.

E. TERMINATION OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY

1. Formal recognition by the Arab States and Israel of the termination of the state of belligerency.

2. Discontinuance of all measures designed to prevent trade with Israel by non-Arab countries and non-Arab firms, and the removal of restrictions, other than normal maritime regulations, from all shipping.

F. COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS

1. Israel to accord Jordan free port facilities at Haifa and free access to port.

2. Mutual overflight rights to be granted innocent civil aircraft.

3. Israel to permit restoration or construction across its territory of telecommunications facilities between the Arab States.

G. UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT OF JORDAN VALLEY

The States affected to agree to proposals for the unified development of Jordan Valley, as developed in discussions with Ambassador Johnston.

H. GUARANTEE OF SECURITY

The U.S., U.K. and perhaps other nations to offer to enter into formal treaty engagements with the Arab States and Israel to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the definitive boundaries established between Arab States and Israel.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Cost of Arab-Israel Settlement: FHR’s memo to S, with Spec. Assistant’s reply (Feb 14 and 15). Top Secret; Alpha. Russell furnished copies of this memorandum to Robert B. Anderson, Hoover, Allen, and Director of Central Intelligence Dulles.
2. Not printed.
3. Top Secret; Alpha.