Office of the Historian

93. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1

Cairo,May 10, 1955—4 p.m.

1685.Burns called May 9 and summarized his conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Khairat Said and Gohar.2 Egyptians extremely [Page 183] reserved regarding high-level talks stating they had no official information as to Israeli reaction to Burns’ four “concrete proposals” and saw difficulties in second paragraph agenda proposed by Burns in his April 16 letter (Jerusalem tel 287 April 16).3 Burns informed Egyptians Israelis had agreed to three of four “concrete proposals” but had refused discuss joint patrols except at “high-level talks”. In his proposed agenda,Burns said he as chairman would make sure no discussion took place thereunder unless agreed to by both sides.

Egyptians replied that under these circumstances they saw no need for high-level talks since Egypt had already accepted in principle Burns’ four points and negotiations to implement them could best be handled by Gohar.Burns pointed out Israelis unwilling discuss joint patrols at operational level and Shalev4 (Gohar’s opposite number) had no authority commit Israeli Government in negotiation on other points.Burns also stressed advantages Israeli Foreign Office participation talks since its views “more moderate” than those of War Department and IDF. Egyptians appeared unconvinced but asked Burns summarize his points in writing. (Summary Burns letter to be delivered Government of Egypt today in immediately following telegraph.5)

I told Burns that while we of course fully supported his efforts reduce border tension it would be extremely difficult in my opinion for Government of Egypt agree undertake at this time major move in direction of Israelis such as high-level talks would represent and pointed out Gohar was responsible authority this subject in Egyptian Government with direct access Nasser. It seemed to me that care must be taken avoid concentration of efforts on high-level talks to such a point that Government of Egypt might renege on its promise cooperate with Burns on his four “concrete proposals”.Burns replied he was under instructions SYG press for direct talks but obviously this line could not be further developed usefully if Government of Egypt were categorically to refuse. In answer my question Burns noted that on Israeli side considerable importance is attached to direct talks. He recognized possibility Israeli refusal accept principle joint patrols was being used as bargaining point. He aware Egyptian [Page 184] position re talks difficult but pointed out impending Israeli election would hardly contribute to modification Israeli position.

Press today gave very full coverage to Burns visit highlighting Egyptian willingness cooperate on four points with following reservations:

1)
barbed wire not to be placed on d/l but in egyptian territory;
2)
no direct contact could be accepted under local commanders agreement—contact could be maintained through un representatives.

Press made no mention “high-level talks”.

Byroade
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–1055. Secret. Received at 7:26 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and USUN.↩
  2. Lieutenant Colonel Salah Gohar, Head of the Palestine Department, Egyptian Ministry of War.↩

  3. Telegram 287 from Jerusalem to Cairo, sent to the Department as telegram 132, transmitted the text of an April 16 letter from Burns to the Egyptian and Israeli Governments proposing that both governments send high-ranking representatives to meet together with Burns and suggesting the following agenda:

    “(A) implementation of Security Council resolution of 30 April 1955; (B) other points which the two parties to the general armistic agreement may agree to discuss, relating to the improvement of the situation in the area concerned.” (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1655)

    ↩
  4. Ariel Shalev of the Israeli Defense Force.↩
  5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–1055)↩