Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

92. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 10, 1955¹

Washington,May 10, 1955

SUBJECT

• Israel’s Need for Security Guarantee; Proposals to Lessen Arab-Israel Tension

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• NEA—Mr.George V. Allen
• NE—Mr.Donald C. Bergus

Ambassador Eban opened the conversation by stating that he felt that good progress was being made in the negotiations with Mr.Eric Johnston. Mr.Eban hoped that Mr.Johnston could now secure Arab agreement in his forthcoming trip to the area.

The Ambassador referred to the letter of May 4, sent by Prime Minister Sharett to the Secretary.² The letter could be summarized briefly in that Israel wished a formal security association with the United States and also was willing to cooperate in measures to relieve tensions in the area. Mr.Dulles’ letter of April 16³ had appeared to link these two matters. Mr.Sharett had replied that while Israel was interested in both subjects, she did not feel that one should be made conditional on the other. This could well stimulate Arab intransigence toward a settlement with Israel. There was a further logical defect. The United States regarded a security guarantee as a sequel to the relief of tensions, Israel regarded it as a means to such relief. Therefore Israel would like a guarantee first, and action towards a settlement of some of the outstanding issues with the Arabs second. Israel understood the U.S. position on the matter, however, and was willing to work simultaneously on both.

Mr.Allen expressed appreciation for this clarification since he had not understood this new point in Mr.Sharett’s letter. Mr.Eban replied that the letter had been hurriedly drafted so that the Secretary would have an opportunity to study it before proceeding to Europe and meeting with the British Foreign Secretary. Israel stood by her position that a security treaty should come first but was willing to discuss both this and measures to reduce tension simultaneously.

The Ambassador continued that Mr.Sharett’s letter had defined rather precisely Israel’s views regarding measures to reduce tension. Israel felt that the best point to start on would be payment of compensation to Arab refugees by Israel in return for a lifting of the secondary boycott and the Suez blockade by the Arabs. These were not the most delicate of the issues outstanding, and consequently afforded a good place to begin. The relatively quick beneficial effect which the implementation of such measures would have on the refugee problem was also of importance.

Mr.Eban said that since the Secretary had mentioned border adjustments and the refugee problem, the Prime Minister had reiterated Israel’s position that there could be no sizeable cessions of Israel territory or return of refugees. This did not, however, preclude a willingness to consider minor and mutual adjustments as well as the continuation of the plan for the reunion of refugee families. Mr.Eban wished to emphasize the word “mutual” in his reference to border adjustments. Israel was not morally bound to cede territory to the Arabs. She could, however, participate in a process of exchange even if this should mean that the Arabs might end up as a net beneficiary. The abortive attempt to make adjustments in the Latrun area was an example of what might be done.

Mr.Eban concluded by stating that he felt Israel’s position on this matter was not far from that of the U.S. in substance and that the difference could be bridged in practice.

Mr.Allen said that the Secretary would be giving his reaction to Mr.Sharett’s letter upon his return. His own personal view was that progress on the Jordan River negotiations was the touchstone to progress on the other matters. Mr.Eban replied that he felt good progress was being made on the Jordan question. He added that Israel was concerned lest there be possible divergencies of views between the U.S. and Israel regarding territorial adjustments or repatriations. Mr.Allen answered that the need for success on the Jordan River negotiations made us reticent on the other points at this time.

Mr.Eban asked if the U.S. Government was working with the United Kingdom on these overall questions. Mr.Allen replied that we were making every effort to keep in close touch with the British on this matter. This did not mean that our views would at all times be identical. Mr.Eban pointed out that the Secretary had mentioned only substantial progress toward stabilization of the situation as a condition precedent to a U.S. security guarantee. In his recent speech before Parliament, Sir Anthony Eden had talked of British willingness to guarantee Arab-Israel “peace”.⁴ Israel was concerned regarding this apparent difference in view and felt that the British might be taking a stand which was impractical and perfectionist. Mr.Allen ventured the guess that the British, with their long tradition of practicality, would not be perfectionists on this matter.

Mr.Eban asked if France was associated in this effort. Mr.Allen replied that France had interests in the area and was associated in the Tripartite Declaration. We would try to work with the French in the most appropriate manner. The French position was clouded, however, by such factors as the special position which France felt she had in Syria and Lebanon, as well as France’s interests in North Africa. This would probably mean that liaison with the French on these questions would be slower than our contacts with the British.

Mr.Eban asked if Mr.Allen would confirm the recent speech by Congressman Bentley⁵ to the effect that the U.S. envisaged arms aid only to Iraq during FY 1956.⁶ Mr.Allen replied that a public statement of policy such as this could come only from the Secretary. He imagined that there would be further informal indications of the lack of present U.S. intention to grant arms aid to Israel or her immediate Arab neighbors. Perhaps a public statement by the Secretary should be made. However, it might have an undesirable effect on the Jordan Valley negotiations, and there might be other reasons against a formal declaration of policy at this moment. He felt that timing was an important factor in considering a public statement.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–1055. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Bergus.
2. See Document 87.
3. Document 79.
4. On April 4; for text of his remarks, seeParliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, volume 539, columns 894–904.
5. Alvin M. Bentley (R–Mich.), Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
6. Not further identified.