Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv,April 21, 1955—3 p.m.

904. When I called on the Prime Minister yesterday he said “You find me in a very discouraged mood” referring to the SC decision in meeting April 11 [19] to postpone Israel complaint against Egypt. He said effect throughout Israel certain to be bad with press and public speakers stressing severe unfavorable attitude toward SC. The SC failure to act was a “manifest instance of partiality” and “will encourage further acts of hostility against Israel”. “What are we supposed to do?” he asked. “Egypt takes these actions against us and we are told not to shoot but refer matter to UN.MAC condemns Egypt which continues actions and we refer matter to the SC which takes no action against Egypt.” “What can one expect the public of Israel to think?” In reply to my question as to his idea of the reasons for the SC failure to act he said he could only surmise that “they were afraid a condemnation of Egypt might jeopardize the plan for high-level talks.” Called his attention to fact that the subject could be raised again but he countered with question of whether I expected Israel would ask for reopening of matter and again receive slap in the face.

Sharett also raised subject of MAC report on shooting of American (Jerusalem’s 291 on Department²) and Chairman’s failure to specifically identify killer. This could only be interpreted as fear of displeasing Jordan and thus must be regarded as prejudice. This had already aroused ire of Israel press and he regretted attacks on “an American military officer” but it reflected attitude of public toward UN’s action.

I gathered from his postponement of my original morning appointment and other comment that he had been closeted with Ben Gurion and others of [garble—Cabinet?] all morning for discussion of SC matter and government policy in light of that disappointment; the issuance of a public statement on the matter to be released at once;³ the proposed high-level meeting with Egypt and General Burns as outlined in latter’s letter to Prime Minister (Jerusalem’s 261⁴) and other pressing policy matters.

Regarding high-level meeting he volunteered information that he was accepting the Burns proposal (Jerusalem’s 262⁵) but wanted to make it clear that proposal for high-level meeting he made originally (Embtel 858⁶) had now been “superseded by the Burns proposal” and there would be only one program of high-level talks and not two. When I enquired as to his thinking as to the level of the talks he said GOI was willing to have them at ministerial level or even at “just below ministerial level” (meaning Secretary General of Foreign Office I believe). He remarked that if Egypt insisted on lesser level he would be very displeased with idea. I feel that the Prime Minister would not be surprised if Egypt would find itself with no one in the high-level categories with authority to participate in such talks in absence of Nasser,Salem and Fawzi but he indicated willingness GOI proceed without delay. He said letter accepting Burns proposal had been drafted but he gave no details of content.

When I enquired whether it was correct to assume that the discussions were to be limited strictly to the improvement of the situation in the border area and he agreed that the meetings were to be held under the auspices of General Burns, he said the first assumption was correct but he had not given the second point definite thought. However he “felt that point could be worked out”. I then told him that “it is the view of the US Government that the discussions should be under the chairmanship of General Burns; should be limited to the SC resolution of March 30; and that such discussions have obvious priority over other possible negotiations.”

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2155. Secret. Received at 5:49 a.m., April 22. Repeated to Cairo and London.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 285.1113 Harris,Charles B./4–1855)
3. See footnote 2,infra.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/4–155)
5. See footnote 2, Document 63.
6. Document 65.