Office of the Historian

54. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1

Cairo,March 21, 1955—4 p.m.

1378. I have discussed Department’s 15312 on March 19 with Stevenson. Following is our joint considered opinion.

Begin verbatim text:

1.
Nasser is sore and suspicious. It would be both unwise and useless to make official secret approach to him at the present time for following reasons:
(a)
Approach would tend to persuade him of truth of his colleagues assertions that Turco-Iraqi pact was part of deep laid plot aimed by the US and UK at splitting the Arab world and softening Egypt up.
(b)
His recent diplomatic defeat over Turco-Iraqi pact forces him for the present at any rate into a more nationalistic and thus less realistic attitude. He would therefore be quite unreceptive.
(c)
Effect on [of] Gaza incident has not scared Nasser. It has merely increased his hostility to Israel.
(c)
[sic] Inducements on Arab side of proposed settlement re all extraneous and [aid?] would have to be increased to an unacceptable extent to cause him even to consider them at this time.
2.
A premature approach would risk setting back indefinitely any hope of settlement. But we think that if present Arab squabble can be to some extent smoothed over and Nasser broadens his horizon a little by his attendance at the Afro-Asian conference it may be possible for Ambassador Byroade to sound him out informally and unofficially after his return at the end of April.
3.
US and UK Governments should do what they can to restore Nassers confidence in us and in himself as he remains best hope of promoting eventual settlement.

End verbatim text.

Byroade
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–2155. Top Secret; Alpha. Received at 2:39 p.m. Repeated to London.↩
  2. Document 52.↩