53. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1379.Deptel 1531 (repeated information London 4775)2 received [Page 116] and discussed with Stevenson although we had discussed subject several times since my arrival. Our joint conclusions being sent separately.3 Deeply regret necessity those conclusions as know how important this subject is to Department and Secretary.
As a supplement to our agreed message following might be useful.
- (a)
- Do not believe at this particular time Nasser would find it possible to proceed even if he himself were in agreement. This is because of Gaza, internal position, complications re position before other Arab states just at time this important in view developments following Turk-Iraq pact, etc.
- (b)
- On this particular subject there is at present danger of causing serious misunderstanding with him as to nature of US policies and methods of operation. He has not believed, but acquiesced for local and other reasons, in propaganda instigated by Saleh Salem that real motive of US behind northern tier and Turk-Iraqi pact matter was indirect method of forcing settlement and integration of Israel into defense. If at this stage Nasser were to be confronted by fact that the US and UK have been working for some time on specific plan for settlement of Arab-Israeli dispute there is great danger he would conclude Saleh and others may have been correct.
While I thus feel strongly type of approach Department has in mind to be out of question at this stage, do not believe it necessary to avoid discussion of subject within next few weeks as opportunities rise with Nasser personally and alone on strictly informal basis. After such soundings (during which I can stress my own view that it is Egypt’s interest move forward on this problem) we may be in better position to advise as to future timing, etc. Department cautioned however not pin much hope on real progress being made here in near future in view general situation.