Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

467. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv,December 23, 1955—10 a.m.

641. Following represents mosaic of events leading up to and following Tiberias action which I have put together from following sources (A) source personally and officially close to Ben Gurion (B) source officially close to Sharett and (C) IDF general officer. Although to some extent their comments dealt with separate phases of developments to extent they overlapped there appeared to be no inconsistencies.

1. On Friday December 9Ben Gurion met with Dayan and members of general staff in Tel Aviv to discuss steps to be taken to protect settlers during coming fishing season. Use of artillery to shell Syrian gun positions (this done last year) considered but rejected in part because civilian casualties would result. Plan provisionally adopted on that date a limited one and while directed at area in which action finally took place envisaged Syrian casualties and prisoners of same magnitude as earlier Syrian ambushes (Embtel 403²). (It will be noted this discussion and preliminary decision made December 9 one day before alleged shelling of Israel patrol boat given officially by GOI as action precipitating retaliation.)

2. On December 10 Chief of Staff Dayan went to Ben Gurion in Jerusalem and explained giving reasons therefore that plan authorized day before which based on limited Syrian casualties and avoidance civilian casualties dangerous one and would probably result in heavy Israel losses.Ben Gurion then authorized shift of plans to one put in operation following evening.

3. Golda Myerson left for US morning of December 11. Some time between Ben Gurion’s first conference with IDF on December 9 and her departure December 11 he could have notified her of proposed operation in her capacity as Acting Foreign Minister and had she known she would have called in Eshkol and Aranne for consultation with Ben Gurion re advisability such operation in light its impact world opinion and effect on arms procurement negotiations.Ben Gurion however failed to consult any of his Mapai colleagues.

4. When Eban heard of Tiberias action he sent strong telegram to Foreign Ministry listing seven reasons why incident mistake. Three reasons given specifically to me were: Effect on Arab question adverse impact on US public opinion and effect on British Parliamentary debate Middle East issues. Telegram referred to Ben Gurion who replied in personal letter to Eban setting forth his justification which along lines (A) invasion Arab territory no more horrendous than denying to Israelis use their own territory, and (B) necessary to assure to settlers their complete security.

5. On December 14 Minister of Religion Shapira (religious parties) in his capacity as Chairman convened meeting of Cabinet Foreign Affairs Committee. Supported by Rosen (Progressive) and Ben Tov (Mapam) he took most critical line of Tiberias action claiming Ben Gurion’s decision unconstitutional because it had not been approved by his committee and stating he taking matter to Cabinet. Aranne (Mapai) out of embarrassment absented himself from meeting. Eshkol (Mapai) attended and out of party loyalty defended Ben Gurion’s action.Mapai Central Committee is to debate issue coming weekend.

6. Apparently Ben Gurion had some second thoughts because on December 16 he convened at Ministry of Defense IDF General Staff and all senior officers. At this meeting he laid down line that in next months (according to one version he said “two or three months” and according to another “three or four months”) it would be necessary for IDF to exercise uninterrupted restraint along border irrespective of difficulties of provocations. These months would be decisive in determining arms procurement and Israel’s future. When one officer asked “what do we do if we don’t get arms”Ben Gurion replied “we will deal with that barrier when we meet it”.³ (Last week Congress-woman Frances Bolton at my suggestion asked Ben Gurion what would happen if Israel failed to get additional arms. She said he replied he would cross that bridge when he reached it.)

7. According to associates Sharett returned to Israel more discouraged and depressed than outraged. With reference to Tiberias action he asked question: “How can I ever face Dulles again? He will either believe me guilty of duplicity; that I am not important enough to have been consulted; or my position so weak that having been consulted my advice rejected”.

Comment: Sources cited above all in position to have had in their possession information imparted to me. Question I cannot answer is why they spoke as freely as they did.

Although possibly not factor in Ben Gurion’s Tiberias action decision have reason to believe that element in IDF’s proposal for action was Army’s unrelenting efforts obtain release their four soldiers imprisoned Damascus. It is basic moral tenet IDF that Army in no case will “let down” its soldiers. Furthermore recent letters to families indicate prisoners “cracking up” mentally.

Re paragraph 6 above this conference followed immediately after two discussions which Streibert and I had with Prime Minister.⁴ Streibert deserves high marks for effectiveness shock treatment he gave Ben Gurion re Tiberias action and for conviction with which he stated his belief Nasser really wanted settlement.

White

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/12–2355. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 10:08 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Damascus, and Cairo.
2. See footnote 3, Document 452.
3. An apparent transcript of Ben Gurion’s address to the General Staff is in Department of State,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc. during Eden talks: Dec. 11 to Feb. 15, 1956.
4. See Document 462.