Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

462. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv,December 16, 1955—5 p.m.

614.USIA Director Streibert met Wednesday and Thursday² with Ben-Gurion.Herzog and Chargé were present at conversations.

Principal points made by Streibert were:

1. As result his conversations Cairo he greatly impressed with possibilities for peace settlement. For first time an Arab country admitted existence of Israel as state through public statements made by Egyptian Government regarding Eden’s November 9 speech. Secondly,Nasser had told him he interested in settlement; that Eden’s statement point from which matters could proceed and he prepared to discuss boundaries and compensation. Finally Streibert said in conversation Baghdad Nuri Said had also indicated this was good time for settlement.

2. He emphasized incidents such as Tiberias action put off peace and made its achievement more difficult. He pointed this up (with visible effect on Ben-Gurion) by describing funeral cortege, flowers on caskets and solemnity of crowds watching procession which he saw in Damascus.

3. Streibert added that some people in Arab States had doubts whether Israel really wanted peace and had suggested it interested in stirring up trouble to obtain funds from abroad.

Ben-Gurion in reply made following principal points:

1. Allegation to 3 was untrue. Israel wanted peace which apart from its intrinsic worth was essential to enable state to meet its two great problems of receiving immigrants and of integrating them into nation.

2. As regards 2 above Ben-Gurion restated traditional rationalization of doctrine of retaliation but avoided any reference to specific incident to which Streibert had alluded.

3. Larger part Ben-Gurion’s comments devoted to Streibert’s appraisal situation in Cairo. Firstly, he doubted whether Nasser really wanted settlement. Israel had made numerous approaches beginning with Naguib and continuing throughout Nasser’s regime with negative results. Referring to Sunday’s³ conversation with General Burns and Cairo radio reports Ben-Gurion gave as example Egyptian “rejection”UN Secretary General’s Nitzana proposals.

“Nasser is smiling at the US but he doesn’t smile at Israel”. He,Ben-Gurion, had to take into account possibility of attack by Egyptians when they ready. His position was similar to Eisenhower’s if Russia possessed atomic bomb but US did not. Would we under those circumstances believe peaceful remarks of Molotov?Ben-Gurion said “we are deadly afraid”.Nasser will have 200 Migs and 50 Ilyushin bombers. Egypt already has superiority in heavy equipment. Israel has slight superiority in quality of her men. All this means “I have to think of possibilities of our settlements (border) being destroyed, of tens of thousands of flower of our youth losing their lives and of Tel Aviv and Haifa being destroyed in half hour from air”. (Ben-Gurion expressed doubt whether Egyptians would destroy Jerusalem mentioning holy places.)Ben-Gurion added “nevertheless I do not believe they could completely destroy us. We would fight too hard for them but results would be … ”⁴ (He then repeated statements above re destruction of cities, settlements and loss of youth.)

When Streibert inquired whether he could not rely on UN to prevent such an aggression Ben-Gurion replied he could not. In 1948 when the UN was not as divided as it is today not finger lifted to help Israel meet onslaught of six Arab armies. Furthermore damage would be done before any action could be taken.

Ben-Gurion turned to question peace settlement and said he prepared to talk with Nasser immediately. He proposed following specific steps:

1. Cease-fire by Egypt and Israel.Ben-Gurion undertook during week or so which USG would require to get reply from Nasser to his proposal to abstain from retaliations even in face of provocation.

2. Strict observance of armistice agreement.

3. Once these prerequisites had been met discussions could commence. He was prepared to work for peace in stages.

4. He accepted agenda which Nasser suggested to Streibert. He prepared to talk about compensation also about boundaries “on give and take basis”.Ben-Gurion several times used expression “give and take” relative to boundaries.

5. When Streibert mentioned Nasser’s apparent condition re using Eden’s statement as starting point Ben-Gurion said Nasser free to interpret Eden’s statement as he wished; but he,Ben-Gurion, also free to place his own interpretation on it or to use any starting point he desired and that important thing was start talking.

When Streibert pointed out that direct conversations between Nasser and Ben-Gurion probably impracticable at this moment Ben-Gurion said he had no objection in earlier stages of negotiation to use of intermediaries; he believed however that before negotiations could really be productive direct talks would be necessary; but such direct talks if that stage reached could be held with some Israeli other than himself.

Comment: In my judgment Ben-Gurion’s proposals mark some advance from similar overtures which he made in past. Firstly, on territorial question he has proceeded from “not an inch of territory” to “mutual minor border adjustments” to process of “give and take”. Checking my notes of conversation this morning with Herzog he indicated his belief that Ben-Gurion’s position on territorial question been modified somewhat by his statement to Streibert.

Secondly, his undertaking to abstain from retaliatory actions against Egypt irrespective of provocation while given for only short period gives some evidence seriousness of purpose when considered relative to public mood here and political hazards which he would encounter in adhering to commitment should one or two Israelis lose their lives during next week along Egyptian border. Streibert and I undertook to transmit his proposals to US Government but gave him no assurance Department would transmit them to Nasser.

I anticipate by Tuesday next⁵ Foreign Ministry will inquire whether Nasser has received proposals and by end of next week will be pressing for his reply.⁶

White

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/12–1655. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:28 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Cairo on December 17.
2. December 14 and 15.
3. December 11.
4. Ellipsis in the source text.
5. December 20.

6. White informed the Department of State on December 17 that “Streibert in discussions with Ben-Gurion was unaware subject matter Washington discussions Secretary–Sharett and Russell–Shiloah,” and White said that he had not informed Streibert of these conversations. (Telegram 617 from Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/12–1755)

   The Department on December 20 informed the Embassy in Tel Aviv that it had “advised Shiloah that … Streibert … was unaware of conversations initiated by Secretary and Sharett and carried forward by Russell and Shiloah.Shiloah indicated he would so advise IG.” (Telegram 431 to Tel Aviv;ibid., 674.84A/12–1655)