Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

465. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv,December 21, 1955—8 p.m.

632. Following comments are submitted in regard to Alpha project as set forth Deptel 411 to Tel Aviv:²

1. Proposals, with modifications, appear reasonable and to have some chance of acceptance by Israel after a period of direct or indirect negotiations extending over three or four years. Conclusion regarding time required is based on following:

(A) Negotiating experience with Israeli Government on many subjects past two years, including Johnston water plan, has convinced me that in cases where real concessions required, Israelis are … incapable of moving rapidly. In present case GOI is convinced that Arab objectives destructive and Arab tactics Machiavellian. This distrust compounded by traditional suspicion of GOE motives, already reflected in this exercise by virtual rejection of UK as participating mediator. These suspicions were best exemplified by Sharett’s own comment, inadvertently published, that Dulles proposal was a “mine field” (through which Israel must tread slowly and with extreme caution). Another strong characteristic of GOI in negotiations is propensity to remain adamant on a specific point until convinced that other party has made best offer. As Eric Johnston can testify this requires a lot of conviction.

(B) Second element in time period is present power framework within Israel. The Alpha proposals are of such a character that on each facet of the territorial and repatriation questions the Israeli negotiators would be looking over one shoulder at the Israel defense force and over the other at the Herut and General Zionist opposition, as well as at important militant elements in the Mapai and Achdut Avoda Government parties. Each proposed bolder adjustment from Metulla to Hebron would be minutely examined by the IDF to ascertain whether from military standpoint it increases or decreases Israel’s defensibility. In latter-type cases resistances to change would be great. Re refugee problem, each small increment in proposed repatriation quota beyond token reunion family level would result increased internal resistances on grounds economic liability and increased security (fifth column) crisis.

When Negev reached Israeli negotiators would be looking over both shoulders. If southernmost triangulation proposed,IDF would say Eilat becomes indefensible; if two double triangles, that area between the two likewise indefensible. Opposition groups would make most of emotional issue and GOI would find itself, as it already dimly perceives, victim of its own propaganda.

2. Am convinced that present trends in this area are running so strongly against us that US Government cannot afford the luxury of the time period required to lead Israel to a settlement through the voluntary negotiation process now envisaged; and that long before agreement reached we would be faced with problem negotiation new armistice rather than a peace agreement.

3. Conclusion reached is that if there is to be a quick settlement, it must be of an imposed character.

4. One possible approach would be to maintain an arms embargo, particularly jet aircraft, on Israel until such time as Egyptian (and other Arab) acquisition and absorption Soviet (and Western) arms reaches point Israel required to make quick peace on any terms. Have explored this approach relative to current psychology here, making every effort distinguish what Israelis really believe from that which they want us to believe.

In my judgment, the Israelis have no intention of permitting situation to develop along lines set forth preceding paragraph. They are convinced they have their backs to the wall (or sea) and they will not hesitate to use every possible instrument at their command during the next few months when they believe they still retain some freedom of action.

• Firstly, they are preparing greatest possible mobilization friends in the United States. While they recognize their leverage if President to be a candidate, they do not have same feeling in case prospect is for close election. Arms procurement to equate Soviet arms will be the issue raised and should it become complicated by outbreak hostilities in some form, prospects would be good for another “China controversy”.
• Secondly, it is only two months since question was posed in Cabinet of (1) preventive action against Egypt or (2) arms procurement.³Department can draw its own conclusions what happens re latter approach rendered abortive by concurrence. Other Western powers in Macmillan’s contention (Secto 8⁴) that plane deliveries to Israel should be suspended because introduction new types of equipment e.g. [garble] [Mystere 4–A?] (would alter character of armaments situation in area). I had assumed that alteration armament situation this area was already a fact, deriving from Soviet sales to Egypt MIG 15’s and jet bombers.
• Finally, am unconvinced, in spite of Nasser’s protestations to the contrary, that, if by some miracle we could hold Israelis in check, Egyptians could be relied on to exercise restraint once new weapons have created the necessary confidence in their officer corps.

5. Although present Alpha approach appears self-[garble—defeating?] because of time element and a settlement imposed by arms embargo impracticable, I do believe that an expeditious settlement is possible. This would require a framework of extraordinary collection of incentives and disincentives and a revised approach which, while requiring larger modifications basic Israel position than does Alpha, would be more acceptable to Israelis for reasons which I hope will become apparent on study suggestions to be transmitted subsequent telegram.⁵

White

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–2155. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:24 a.m., December 22. Repeated to London and Cairo.
2. Printed as Document 446.
3. Document 350.
4. Document 463.
5. Document 469.