Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

464. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris,December 17, 1955—1 a.m.

Secto 9. At luncheon meeting this noon² Secretary told Macmillan of his recent meeting with Sharett.³ Said he had planned tell Sharett re IG arms request that U.S. prepared sell equipment Defense had reported as available, which came to about $10 million and was essentially defensive in nature, but that balance of IG request, including planes and tanks, not available for immediate delivery; that as to latter, would try to get ready for delivery but final decision would depend on conditions at time including any IG use of aggressive tactics. As result of Israel retaliatory raid on Syria past week, however, Department had informed Sharett no decisions on arms request possible at this time.⁴ Secretary said we will in any event discuss any proposed arms sales to area with Ambassadorial Committee.Macmillan said U.K. had agreed with IG to deliver Meteors around this time but will inform IG that it intends hold up delivery at least until UN acts on Syrian complaint following last week’s IDF raid. Secretary said we had just been informed by French that they would like to sell to IG twelve Mystere 4–A planes which they would like take from 225 being produced under Off-Shore Procurement and which would have effect of delaying these planes for NATO somewhat. Secretary said if anyone going to sell jet planes to Israel perhaps preferable have French do it. In any event should be taken up in Ambassadorial Committee.

With respect to possible Israel-Arab settlement Secretary said IG ambiguous re what it will do on question of Negev.Sharett had started out by saying IG would make no concessions but his final words had been IG not willing enter negotiations prepared to yield on issue but is prepared to have Negev on agenda for negotiations. Secretary said Israel is in desperate plight in long run and it may precipitate war hoping we will back them. Secretary referred to Sharett suggestion we wait for two months to see whether Nasser carried out promise to obtain Arab agreement on Jordan Valley plan. Secretary said he had told Sharett that two months was too long to wait. There will be two months of quasi-balance with IG having force in being and Egypt hope of favorable change in ratio of power. After that, one side or other may decide to attack.

Secretary said he had been visited on Saturday⁵ by group of Arab Ambassadors⁶ and had informed them U.S. might give Israel some arms though not all it was asking for, pointing out we were selling arms to Syria, Saudi-Arabia and Iraq. Ambassadors made no particular protest. They urged U.S. not give special security treaty to Israel and Secretary had informed them we had no intention of doing so.

In response to Macmillan’s query as to next steps in obtaining Israel-Arab settlement, Secretary said probably desirable to work through present staffs for time being as essential to maintain secrecy; if we can obtain assent of two sides to negotiate, time may come when full-time mediator necessary.

Macmillan said it appears then that immediate problem is obtaining IG willingness to discuss Negev; then we can approach Nasser through our Ambassadors in Cairo; and thereafter decide how best handle negotiations.

Secretary expressed hope U.K. would contribute $20 million of $70 million which U.S.–U.K. must provide for preliminary construction on Aswan Dam.Macmillan said he had already wired U.K. Embassy in Washington stating U.K. would provide $15 million and thought matter could be worked out. Secretary said Aswan Dam important not only to meet Soviet efforts at penetration but also as anchor to windward re peace in area as Egypt could not have dam with war going on.Macmillan said French and Germans had offered to help in financing dam as they anxious to participate in construction and realize it would probably work out that countries that put up money will, in rough and ready way, get contracts.

Secretary said that problems in the Arabian Peninsula were causing us concern as of course they were U.K. also. We felt U.K. had been taking important actions without advance consultation with us and that two governments ought to work out some way of concerting action.Macmillan said U.S. and U.K. in close collaboration on many problems in Middle East and he is sure we can work out similar cooperation on these problems. We need joint appreciation of situation, appraisal of our assets and sources of strength in area and decisions on how best use them. Among assets is U.K. position in Persian Gulf. Arab leaders in Gulf area must have confidence in U.K. If not they will be prey to Communist efforts. If U.K. had not taken action in Buraimi it would have lost its influence in entire Gulf area. Secretary pointed out assets of West include U.S. position in Saudi Arabia which must be balanced against those of U.K. Secretary said important to have joint study group working on Middle East problems and attempting to work out joint position before Eden visit.Macmillan said Shuckburgh could come to Washington in January.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627,CF 638. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell and repeated to London, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. Received at 4:27 a.m.
2. According to Secretary Dulles’ Appointment Book, this luncheon meeting with Macmillan on December 15 began at 1:15 p.m. and adjourned at 2:15 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
3. Document 437.
4. Document 454.
5. December 10.
6. According to Secretary Dulles’ Appointment Book, he and Fraser Wilkins met with the Arab Ambassadors on Monday, December 12, at 11:02 a.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)Wilkins’ memorandum of this conversation, not printed, is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.86/12–1255.