Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

460. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State¹

Damascus,December 15, 1955—1 p.m.

582. Embassy telegrams 570² and 576.³ Information available here from UN and GOS sources indicates no foundation exists for Israeli charge that December 11 attacks on Syria provoked by Syrian attacks on Israeli fishing vessels (Tel Aviv’s 110⁴). Syrian Army aware its vulnerability and, since October 22 Israeli raid (Embassy telegram 410⁵), has followed policy of restraint. Syrian withdrawal reinforcements from frontier area five days before attack can hardly be reconciled with allegation of aggressive intentions.

ISMAC chairman states situation on Lake Tiberias exceptionally quiet since early November, during which period sole complaint involved routine exchange of fire between Syrian shore position and Israeli police boat December 10. Each side claimed other fired first and it virtually impossible for UNTSO to establish responsibility. In chairman’s opinion, December 11 Israeli attack required minimum of one week’s planning and training by special troops. As pointed out in Tel Aviv’s 597 to Department,⁶ it therefore appears December 10 exchange of fire, whether fortuitous or provoked by Israelis, provided excuse, not cause, for December 11 attack.

UNTSO description of attack as “retaliatory action” (Jerusalem’s 186 to Department⁷) of doubtful validity.

GOS attempting hide extent defeat by portraying incident as Syrian repulse of Israeli attempt capture high ground east of Lake Tiberias and by featuring false report of 100 Israeli casualties.

Comment: This attack appears to combine two patterns: That of Qibya, Nahhalin,⁸ Gaza and Khan Yunis, also that of several previous incidents on the Sea of Galilee where Israelis have provoked exchanges of fire while endeavoring to deprive Syrians of their traditional and treaty rights to fish therein.

Tel Aviv Embassy is perhaps in best position appraise Israeli motives and timing of attack. Israeli action has wrought havoc on any plans for peace or tranquility in NE which involve willing Syrian cooperation. In this sense, Israeli attack served also as attack on the recent efforts of the President, the Secretary and British Prime Minister. The Department may wish to treat Israeli raid in this light.

Full repercussions here of December 11 attack cannot yet be appraised. Public emotions have been deeply stirred. Unless satisfaction can be obtained through UN or other processes, there is real danger present government may be faced with the choice of suicidal military action or of abdicating authority in favor of hot heads, largely left wing. Further Israeli attacks will increase this danger. Neither course will promote US interests in Syria or NE.

Prodded by left-wing propagandists and encouraged by left-wingers and others in military and civil offices, many Syrians assume that US approves or acquieseces in Israeli violence, and they are unlikely to be disabused of such ideas without positive and firm action on US part.

Effect of attack on Syrian desire purchase US military vehicles unpredictable but in all probability conflict in Syrian army between leftists and groups relatively but only relatively favorable to West will be exacerbated. Embassy considers it fortunate that note offering sell vehicles was delivered to Syrian Prime Minister Saturday⁹ before shooting began on Sea of Galilee.

When I called on Prime Minister Ghazzi December 14 to convey message contained in Deptel 436,¹⁰ he referred to my conversation of the same day with Foreign Office Secretary General re Syrian protest to Security Council and said he hoped Syria could count on US support in Security Council. I replied I would transmit his request to Department.

In pursuance of declared aims of the President and the Secretary, and with view to (1) restoring measure of Syrian confidence in US, (2) assisting conservative elements in Syrian Government to resist left-wing pressures, and (3) convincing Israelis that sneak attacks are unprofitable, the Department may wish to consider (1) public statement in Washington condemning Israeli aggression, (2) full US support for unequivocal Security Council resolution condemning Israeli attack (3) disapproval of sale of US arms to Israel and (4) effective reduction US bilateral aid to Israel.

Syrians are convinced more firmly than ever that any arms in Israeli hands are offensive arms. Should US now approve the proposed sale of arms to Israel, I believe the resentment here will be so profound that for all practical purposes Syria can thereafter be considered an unfriendly country, whether the Communists take over or not.

Moose

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1555. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:09 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Cairo, Baghdad, London, Paris, Jidda, Ankara, Jerusalem, Tripoli, and Moscow.
2. Dated December 12, it reported the Syrian account of the Israeli raid the previous night. (Ibid., 683.84A/12–1255)
3. Dated December 14, not printed. (Ibid., 684A.86/12–1455)
4. Sent as telegram 592 from Tel Aviv; see footnote 2, Document 452.
5. Dated October 24, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/ 10–2455)
6. Document 452.
7. Dated December 13, it transmitted the text of a UNTSO press release of December 12 which used this expression. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/12–1355)
8. For information concerning the Nahhalin incident of March 28, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, footnote 1, p. 1500.
9. December 10.
10. Dated December 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/ 12–1355)